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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Earlier this year, European leaders endorsed a solemn declaration in Berlin to mark the 
50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome and reaffirmed their commitment to a project that 
has paved the way for peace and prosperity in Europe. Economic integration is central to 
this European success story. A gradual elimination of economic barriers over the last half-
century has helped to raise living standards, ensure a fairer deal for consumers, create new 
opportunities for investors and foster closer economic and political ties between Member 
States. As the Berlin declaration says, "the common market and the euro make us strong". 
2. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the most advanced stage of European 
economic integration to date and it will continue to be an important driver of ever closer 
union in the coming years. For the 318 million people that use the euro on a daily basis, the 
single currency is a tangible symbol of the shared successes and challenges facing Europeans. 
Since the euro was launched in 1999, EMU has delivered a high degree of macroeconomic 
stability and encouraged closer trade and investment ties and deeper financial-market 
integration in the euro area. During this time, the euro has emerged as a major global currency 
and is now widely used as an anchor or reference currency in foreign-exchange arrangements 
and as an official reserve currency. These and other benefits from EMU should represent 
strong incentives for countries to sign up to the euro. 
3. Encouraged by Slovenia's adoption of the euro on 1 January 2007, other Member States 
are stepping up their preparations to enter the euro area. Earlier this year, Cyprus and Malta 
submitted formal requests to the European Commission and the ECB to prepare Convergence 
Reports on the basis of which the Council of Ministers will decide whether these Member 
States can join the euro area on 1 January 2008. 
4. There is a growing awareness that being a member of the euro area means confronting 
common challenges and responsibilities. At this year's Spring European Council, EU leaders, 
in their annual assessment of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, endorsed a new set of euro-area 
specific recommendations in the context of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. 
The recommendations emphasise the need for prudent fiscal policies, improvements in the 
quality of public finances and greater adaptability in the markets for goods and services. They 
also call for a better alignment of wage and productivity developments and an accelerated 
pace of financial-market integration. 
5. The Annual Statement on the Euro Area, and its companion piece, the Annual Report on 
the Euro Area, present the Commission's views on how euro-area countries can meet their 
shared responsibilities and challenges. They are also designed to inform the debate on the 
euro-area's economic performance and the functioning of EMU. The Annual Statement on the 
Euro Area also serves as a contribution to the European Commission's dialogue with the 
European Parliament on euro-area economic policy. 
II. THE EURO-AREA'S RENEWED ECONOMIC VIGOUR 
6. Since last year's Annual Statement on the Euro Area, the euro-area's economic recovery 
has gone from strength to strength. The euro-area grew by 2.7% last year, its fastest growth 
rate since 2000, and well-above its long-term average. Employment growth accelerated to 
around 1.5% in 2006 in the euro area, yielding an increase of close to 2 million new jobs.
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prices eased.  
7. The euro-area's positive growth performance partly reflects the current cyclical upturn 
but it may also show that structural reforms are beginning to take effect. There are signs of 
an increased resilience to global disturbances. The employment effect of recent growth has 
been particularly intense. In December 2006, the unemployment rate dropped to 7.5%, its 
lowest level in 15 years. Labour productivity growth in the euro area averaged 1% in 2006, 
compared with an annual average rate of 0.7% during the previous decade, and several factors 
indicate that this rebound could be more than just cyclical in nature. Overall, these 
developments suggest that Member States are being rewarded for their efforts to, inter alia,
increase labour participation rates, boost R&D and innovation, develop human capital and 
create a more attractive and competitive business environment. They also show the benefits of 
a macroeconomic framework that is designed to enhance stability and promote greater 
certainty about medium-term economic prospects. 
8. Domestic demand is an important driver of economic growth in the euro area. This is 
reflected in the continued buoyancy of investment spending and the revival in household 
spending thanks, in part, to greater consumer confidence and the euro-area's strong 
employment performance. Euro-area exports also made a positive contribution to growth 
despite less favourable economic conditions in some of its key trading partners and the 
appreciation of the euro. 
9. The prospects for continued economic growth in the euro area are more favourable in 
2007 than they have been for many years. Domestic demand is expected to maintain its 
relatively strong momentum, with investment benefiting from ongoing favourable financial 
conditions, improved corporate balance sheets, the need for replacement investment, 
productivity gains and a positive outlook for profits. Global economic growth is likely to 
moderate somewhat but euro-area exports are well placed to continue their strong 
performance. 
10. As ever, there may be economic surprises around the corner. A disorderly correction of 
global imbalances, exchange-rate tensions and geo-political developments are among the 
factors that could lead to lower-than-expected growth in the euro area. Conversely, a stronger 
labour market performance and a more-benign-than-expected impact of ongoing fiscal 
consolidation efforts could lead to higher-than-expected growth. 
III. PUTTING THE MACROECONOMIC HOUSE IN ORDER 
11. Macroeconomic policy needs to be on a sound footing for the euro-area's economic 
recovery to continue. Since December 2005, the European Central Bank has been 
withdrawing the stimulus provided in recent years in view of the medium-term risks to price 
stability. Alongside this, the process of wage determination in euro-area members must pay 
sufficient regard to price stability, trends in productivity over the medium-term and 
differences across skills and local labour-market conditions. Wages in the euro area continued 
to grow moderately in 2006 in spite of price developments and strong output and employment 
growth. Although significant cross-country differences remain, overall wage growth in the 
euro area appears to have been dampened since the 1990s, thus reducing the potential for 
second-round effects induced by the previous oil price increases. In the budgetary sphere, it is 
essential that Member States seize the opportunity created by the economic upturn to 
complete the consolidation of their budgetary positions before the end of the decade. Such 
fiscal consolidation would also enhance the euro-area's overall fiscal-monetary policy mix. 
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12. Euro-area members have made a concerted effort to correct excessive budget deficits.
On 30 January 2007, the Council decided that the excessive deficit procedure against France 
should be closed as its budget deficit remained below 3% also in 2006. In Germany, the 
economic recovery has helped to bring the budget deficit below 3% of GDP one year ahead of 
schedule. In Greece, there has been a strong correction in 2006 which has led the budget 
deficit to remain at 2.6% of GDP. Portugal and Italy have also recorded a significant 
structural improvement in 2006, masked in the case of the latter by the effect of one-off 
measures. In the euro area as a whole, the quality of the adjustment has increased, with less 
reliance on one-off measures, and a decrease in public expenditure. Overall, the combination 
of the consolidation efforts, notably in countries with excessive deficits, and improved 
economic developments, leading to substantially higher-than expected revenues, has reduced 
the euro-area's budget deficit to 1.6% of GDP in 2006, down from 2.5% of GDP in 2005. 
13. Member States, especially those that are in the process of correcting excessive deficits, 
must press ahead with budgetary consolidation to meet their medium-term budgetary 
objectives. Some Member States planned little or no improvement in their structural balances 
in their 2006 Stability Programmes, even though the Stability and Growth Pact calls for 
budgetary consolidation that goes beyond the benchmark of 0.5% of GDP during the good 
times. France, for example, in its programme, plans to improve its structural balance by just 
0.3 percentage points of GDP in 2007. Germany in its stability programme plans no 
improvement of its structural balance in 2008 even though "good times" are forecast. Some 
euro-area members that have reached their medium-term objectives are at risk of a pro-
cyclical fiscal stance in 2007, notably in the Netherlands where a significant deterioration is 
expected this year even though "good times" are forecast. This situation calls for renewed 
efforts: Member States that fail to make sufficient progress in spite of the favourable growth 
may not achieve a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3% of GDP deficit threshold 
if and when the pace of economic growth slows, thus repeating the policy mistakes of the late 
1990s. At the same time the reappearance of structural deficits in countries already in balance 
or in surplus should also be avoided. 
14. On 20 April 2007, the Eurogroup adopted orientations for fiscal policies in euro area 
Member States, recalling the commitment to actively consolidate public finances in good 
times and to use unexpected extra revenues for deficit and debt reduction. With a view to 
improving the coordination of fiscal policies, euro area Finance Ministers discussed national 
budgetary developments in 2007 and the preliminary policy outlook for 2008 and their 
implications for the euro area. Firstly, they committed to build on the better-than-expected 
budgetary outcomes in 2006 and to pursue more ambitious budgetary targets than those set in 
the 2006 Stability Programmes. Secondly, they agreed to implement budgets for 2007 as 
planned, avoiding expenditure overruns, and using unexpected extra revenues to reduce 
government deficit and debt. Thirdly, it was agreed that fiscal policy plans for 2008 should be 
carefully designed so as to accelerate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary 
objectives for Member States which have not reached it and for those which have reached it to 
avoid fuelling macroeconomic imbalances. 
15. The euro-area's strong growth performance presents a golden opportunity for all euro-
area members to put their fiscal houses in order. On the revenue side, there is a strong 
economic case for using revenue windfalls – i.e. from unexpectedly high economic growth – 
to reduce government borrowing. On the expenditure side, the experience of some Member 
States suggests that reductions in government spending tend to provide a more durable 
approach to deficit reduction. After the Stability and Growth Pact has successfully supported 
Member States in the reduction of the excessive deficits, the functioning of its preventive part 
should support Member States in eliminating deficits altogether in order to deal with the 
looming challenges. Following the orientations of the Eurogroup on fiscal policy would mean 
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or 2009 and all of them should aim for 2010 at the latest.  
16. Securing sound public finances will help euro-area members to address the economic 
implications of ageing populations. Dramatic changes in the demographic structure of 
European populations mean that the old age dependency ratio is expected to increase from 
25% at present to more than 50% by 2050 in most Member States. Some of them have already 
taken significant action to address this challenge. If the necessary measures are not taken 
soon, ageing will have a substantial budgetary impact in several euro area countries. Age-
related public expenditure in the euro area, which includes spending on pensions, healthcare 
and long-term care, is projected to increase on average by around 4% of GDP by 2050 under a 
no-policy change scenario. This underlines the need for all Member States to achieve and 
maintain sound budgetary positions over the long-term in order to reduce significantly debt 
ratios and contain the subsequent projected increases in expenditure. This need is particularly 
acute in Member States, such as Greece and Portugal, which run the risk of posting double-
digit increases in age-related public expenditure over the next decades. 
17. Safeguarding the long-term sustainability of public finances in the euro-area requires a 
three-pronged policy approach. Firstly, Member States should, as already noted, step up 
efforts to consolidate their fiscal positions and meet their medium-term budgetary objectives 
under the Stability and Growth Pact. Secondly, the implementation of further structural 
reforms under the Lisbon Strategy will help to foster higher productivity growth and job 
creation thus countering the economic impact of ageing populations. Thirdly, reforms to 
pensions and health care systems and investment in improving years of life spent in good 
health have the potential to improve government finances over the long term. 
18. Ensuring the quality of public finances is also important, as recognised in Member 
States' National Reform Programmes and the EU's Integrated Guidelines for Growth and 
Jobs. A key challenge for Member States is to meet budgetary targets while ensuring that tax 
and expenditure systems promote an efficient allocation of resources. Adapting tax structures 
and directing government expenditure towards items such as education and R&D can increase 
productivity growth and growth potential and bring important social and economic benefits in 
terms of innovation and human capital accumulation. Such policies can also help to put 
Member States' public finances on a more sustainable footing and improve the functioning of 
social models within the euro area.  
19. Political commitments to sound public finances should be reflected in national 
budgetary rules and institutions. Research shows that Member States with well-designed 
numerical expenditure and revenue rules usually maintain a stronger grip on government 
borrowing. As discussed in this year's Annual Report on the Euro Area, Member States 
should, when designing these rules, pay careful attention to their coverage and the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy. Effective fiscal institutions at the national level also 
have a role to play. For instance, parliamentary budget committees can support the conduct of 
sound fiscal policies and, thus, reinforce the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
IV. SECURING SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH 
20. As the euro area reaps the fruits of the Lisbon Strategy, it must also sow the seeds of 
further structural reform. As emphasised by EU leaders at this year's Spring European 
Council with the adoption of specific recommendations for the euro-area, the Lisbon 
economic reform agenda is critical for boosting growth and jobs in all 27 Member States but 
it has an added dimension for the countries that share the single currency. In the first place, 
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economic reforms will reduce inflationary bottlenecks in the euro area and help to sustain the 
economic recovery. In addition, well-functioning product, labour and capital markets are 
essential for ensuring a smooth adjustment to country-specific economic disturbances under 
EMU.
21. The slow adjustment of some euro-area members to country-specific disturbances is 
proof that economic reforms need to go further. A comprehensive study of adjustment by the 
European Commission finds that although the process of competitiveness adjustment in the 
euro area is dynamically stable, some Member States are adjusting too slowly to country-
specific developments. This slow competitiveness adjustment has contributed to the 
persistence of cross-country growth and inflation differences in the euro area, thereby 
exacerbating the costs of policy inaction at the national level.  
22. The Internal Market is indispensable not only for the economic prosperity of the EU but 
also for the smooth functioning of EMU. A dynamic and mature Internal Market can 
potentially encourage a closer alignment of national business cycles and speed up the 
adjustment of prices and wages to economic shocks. A key priority for euro-area and EU 
Member States alike is to ensure that the Internal Market is equipped to meet the opportunities 
and challenges of the 21
st
 Century. When the Single European Act entered into force 20 years 
ago, a fairly homogenous European economy was strongly reliant on the mass manufacture of 
standardised products. In today's world of globalisation, new technologies and EU 
enlargement, an increasingly heterogeneous European economy is more and more reliant on 
knowledge-based and service sectors with a greater degree of product differentiation.
23. At the request of EU leaders, the European Commission has prepared a vision paper 
which calls for the single market to adapt to new realities.1 The crux of the Commission's 
argument is that to deliver more tangible benefits for European citizens, entrepreneurs, 
workers and consumers the single market needs to go beyond measures to tackle cross-border 
legal obstacles to business. Today's policies to deepen the single market must be more impact-
driven, more effective and more globally-oriented. The Commission will present a full review 
of the single market with concrete proposals for policy action in the autumn. 
24. In the area of financial market, the euro area should ensure leadership in stepping up 
the pace of integration at EU level, adding to the impetus already given by the euro. Euro-
area members have a particular need for financial integration as a means of boosting growth 
potential and facilitating adjustment to economic shocks. The Member States that share the 
single currency are now already benefiting from highly integrated markets for derivatives, 
corporate bonds and money. The project to create a Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) will 
also enable consumers, companies and other economic actors to make and receive payments 
in euro, whether between or within national boundaries under the same basic conditions, 
rights and obligations, regardless of their location. Further integration would provide more 
opportunities for cross-border risk sharing and favouring a more efficient allocation of 
resources across the area. Areas where progress should be sought include for example cross-
border clearing and settlement transactions, euro-denominated government bond and bills 
markets – still segmented on the supply side – and mortgage markets at the wholesale (i.e. 
funding) and retail level. 
25. The Commission's White Paper on Financial Services Policy in 2005-2010 provides a 
road map for further financial market integration in the EU and euro area. A timely and 
1 'A Single Market for Citizens', Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Interim Report to 
the 2007 Spring European Council, Brussels, 21.2.2007, COM(2007) 60 final. 
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the EU Financial Service Action Plan at the Member State level is of a considerable 
importance. There is also a need for continuous consultations, ex-post evaluation of existing 
EU policies and rules and impact assessments for new proposal. Alongside these measures, 
further efforts will be required, inter alia, to ensure that EU supervisory arrangements are 
well adapted to an integrated European financial market from the perspective of efficiency 
and stability.
26. Labour-market reforms are bearing fruit in terms of employment and participation, but 
more can be done to facilitate adjustment in relative wages across sectors, promote labour 
participation and facilitate sectoral and geographical mobility. Flexibility-enhancing labour-
market reforms, heightened global competition and a reduction in the oil intensity of 
production and the strength of the euro exchange rate are among the factors that may have 
altered the process of wage formation in the euro area. This development notwithstanding, 
wage moderation remains essential for, inter alia, prolonging the economic recovery, 
anchoring inflation expectations and facilitating competitiveness adjustment. 
27. In the area of product market reform, euro-area members have also made progress but 
there is a need to further enhance competition, innovation and dynamism. The adoption of 
the Services Directive in December 2006 is a major achievement. Ensuring its rapid 
implementation is a key priority and the euro area would benefit from coordinated efforts to 
achieve this goal. In its assessment of Member States' National Reform Programmes for 
Growth and Jobs, the Commission noted that all euro-area members had taken steps to 
promote better regulation and encourage R&D and the diffusion of innovation but called for 
more ambitious measures to tackle low productivity in the services sector. Further steps to 
enhance competition, including by better exploiting the potential of public procurement, and 
improvements to the business environment (e.g. access to financing, restrictive employment 
protection legislation) would allow consumers to benefit more widely from productivity gains 
and the best performing firms in the euro area to grow rapidly. Innovation is another area 
where there is a need to focus efforts. The challenges in high tech sectors and the persistent 
innovation deficit require the creation of a truly competitive Internal Market for services and 
an Internal Market for innovation. A clearer and more efficient Intellectual Property Rights 
system is currently lacking and the European Research area is still too fragmented.  
28. Following the Commission's proposal to establish a new Energy Policy for Europe, EU 
leaders agreed at this year's Spring European Council on targets to combat climate change 
and boost energy security and competitiveness. These goals will be reinforced by, inter alia,
further efforts to create a true internal market for energy and gas and the development of a 
common external policy approach in support of energy policy. The EU's new energy policy, 
while paramount for all EU Member States, is relevant for the euro-area in view of possible 
implications for, inter alia, current-account and price developments.  
V. INCREASING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
29. The euro area is part of an increasingly interdependent global economy. A notable 
development in 2006 was the euro's rising value against key trading partners. Over the year, 
the euro appreciated by around 11% against the US dollar and around 12½% against the 
Japanese yen. This strong performance has continued in the early months of 2007, leading in 
effective terms the exchange rate of euro area to just above its long-term level. Exchange rates 
should reflect economic fundamentals and excess volatility and disorderly movements in 
exchange rates are undesirable for economic growth. In emerging economies with large and 
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growing current account surpluses, especially China, it is desirable that their effective 
exchange rates move so that necessary adjustments will occur.  
30. Widening global imbalances are a warning sign for the global economy. For the year as 
a whole, the US current account deficit widened to USD 857 billion, the largest in its history. 
In Japan, emerging Asian economies and oil exporting economies in the Middle East, current 
account surpluses continued to increase. China's global current-account surplus increased to 
USD 238.5 billion, exceeding its record in 2005. The euro-area's current account is close to 
balance but Europe would not be immune from the effects of a disorderly unwinding of global 
imbalances. Global imbalances remain an important challenge, and while they are showing 
some signs of stabilising, helped by some rebalancing of domestic demand growth, ensuring 
their orderly correction remains a priority. This will be important to avoid potential risks to 
financial stability and to minimise the risk of protectionist reactions. 
31. There is a now a broad consensus among policy makers on how to tackle the problem of 
global imbalances. This has emerged as the outcome of the multilateral consultation process 
launched in April 2006 by the IMF, in which the euro area has actively participated along 
with four other major global players. This process of consultation on global imbalances has 
delivered positive outcome and the IMF should continue to monitor progress. The actions that 
key participants have agree to implement are (i) increased national saving in the USA with 
measures to reduce the budget deficit and promote private saving, (ii) further structural 
reforms in Japan, including fiscal consolidation; (iii) greater exchange rate flexibility in a 
number of surplus countries in emerging Asia, in particular China, (iv) efficient absorption of 
higher oil revenues in oil-exporting countries, and (v) implementing structural reforms to 
sustain the growth potential and boost domestic demand in the euro area. The euro area is 
demonstrating its commitment to press ahead with further structural reforms. The priority now 
is for the other relevant actors to implement the agreed policy agenda in a timely manner in 
line with the IMF's multilateral and bilateral consultations.  
VI. PROJECTING A STRONG VOICE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE 
32. Since last-year's Annual Statement on the Euro Area, several steps have been taken to 
improve the external representation of the euro area. EU Finance Ministers have asked EU 
Member States' IMF Executive Board Representatives to elect a longer-term chair. Details of 
these recommendations have been agreed upon but are not yet implemented. It was also 
agreed to appoint a Commission official in the office of a euro area IMF Executive Director, 
but, here too, implementation has not been achieved yet. Furthermore, the EU and Member 
States have agreed to support the Commission's participation in the G7 on all items within its 
competence. Euro area representatives, including the Commission, have also participated in 
all phases of the IMF multilateral consultation during the last year and euro area common 
positions and terms of references have been developed prior to the G7 and IMFC meetings.  
33. Further steps are needed before the euro-area's external representation is 
commensurate with its growing weight in the global economy. A stronger external 
representation would also allow the euro area to show leadership on issues of its competency, 
such as global imbalances. While the best option for representation of the euro area in the key 
international financial fora and institutions remains the creation of a single euro-area chair, 
there are obstacles to achieving this in the short term, due, in part, to divisions among 
Member States. Building on the Communication, “Europe in the World”, the Commission 
will continue to contribute actively to the development of develop common positions on the 
crucial issue of external representation. 
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and least developed countries. This was reflected by the quotas-and-voice reform package 
agreed at the Annual Meetings of the IMF of Singapore in September 2006, which led to an 
increase of quotas for China and other emerging market economies. The discussion is now 
continuing on further reforms and representation at the IMF and the World Bank. Together 
with the euro area's ambition to speak with a single voice, the economic rise of the key 
emerging market countries is likely to act as a powerful wind of change for the international 
financial system. 
35. The euro area is fostering closer macroeconomic and regulatory cooperation with new 
partners as well as with existing ones. Last year, the European Commission's annual 
macroeconomic and regulatory dialogue with the Chinese Ministry of Finance was 
complemented by a new dialogue with the Chinese National Development and Reform 
Commission. The regular dialogues with Japan continued and a new macroeconomic and 
financial regulatory dialogue with the Russian Government was held in 2006, reflecting the 
growing importance of Russia as a strategic partner of the EU. A new regular macroeconomic 
dialogue between India and the EU is also scheduled to begin this year. New macro-economic 
dialogues with Brazil and South Africa are also being explored to take into account of the role 
these countries pay in their respective regions and their strategic partnership with the Union 
and the euro area.  
VII. PROMOTING EFFECTIVE AND LEGITIMATE POLICY MAKING 
36. To meet shared economic challenges, euro-area countries need an effective system of 
collective governance. In this respect, the Eurogroup plays an increasingly important role in 
promoting a common understanding among euro-area members of shared policy challenges. 
Over the last twelve months, the Eurogroup has, with input from the Commission, sought to 
deepen its consensus on structural reform challenges and other matters relevant for the euro 
area, as highlighted by the euro-area recommendations in the context of the Integrated 
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. Some progress has been made towards improving the 
coordination of economic policies, as witnessed by the adoption of public orientation for 
budgetary policies and the increased attention to the coherence of macroeconomic policies 
and structural reforms. The goal now should be to turn this common understanding into 
concerted policies to meet these challenges and maximise the benefits of the single currency. 
A clearer propensity by Member States to engage in cooperative solutions may help policy 
discussions.
37. The effectiveness of policy making in the euro area is important but so too is its 
legitimacy. Mindful of this goal, the European Commission stands ready to participate in, and 
contribute to, the European Parliament's proposed dialogue on the key challenges facing the 
euro-area economy. The Annual Report on the Euro Area contributes to this understanding by 
presenting an analysis of the economic situation in the euro area, macroeconomic policy 
developments, structural-reform challenges and the external dimension of EMU. 
38. As EMU approaches its 10th anniversary, the European Commission will devote 
increasing attention to evaluating the functioning of EMU and identifying ways to 
maximise the potential of the euro-area economy. A range of issues are relevant here 
including how well-equipped euro-area economic governance is to meet current and future 
challenges and whether policy makers at the European and national level can do more to 
achieve a policy mix that is conducive to higher growth and employment.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
39. Policy makers should seize the opportunity created by the euro-area's renewed 
economic vigour to secure sound public finances and push through further structural 
reforms. The Annual Statement on the Euro Area has highlighted the most salient challenges 
for the euro area at this juncture. In the fiscal domain, Member States must resist the 
temptation of fiscal loosening by intensifying efforts to meet and maintain their medium-term 
budgetary objectives and improving the structure and quality of public finances. Putting the 
Eurogroup's recent orientations on fiscal policy into practice will be very important to 
complete the consolidation at the level of the euro area as a whole, further strengthening the 
credibility of budgetary authorities, and benefiting the fiscal-monetary policy mix. In the 
structural domain, Member States are benefiting from past policies but further reforms are 
indispensable for enhancing the smooth functioning of EMU and boosting long-term living 
standards. At the global level, the euro-area has taken steps over the last year to strengthen its 
external representation in international institutions and fora and to foster macroeconomic 
dialogues with strategic economic partners, also with a view to addressing global imbalances. 
Further steps will be necessary, however, before the euro area can truly speak with one voice 
on international economic issues.  
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SUMMARY 
This 2007 issue of the Annual Report on the Euro Area explores in depth the common economic 
challenges facing euro-area members.  
Macroeconomic developments and policies (Chapter 1): In 2006 GDP grew strongly by 2.7%, up 
from 1.4% in the previous year. Domestic demand strengthened significantly, reflecting a much better 
performance of labour markets. Close to two million jobs were created and unemployment sank to a 15-
year low. Despite pressure in energy prices up to August 2006, inflation remained contained at close to 
2 %. Against this background, the ECB continued normalising interest rates. Services inflation remains the 
largest and most persistent component of core inflation. Hence, measures that address low productivity 
growth and limited competition in the services sector are likely to reduce overall inflation and support 
monetary policy. With respect to fiscal policy, there was an improvement in the euro-area's fiscal deficit 
(1.6% of GDP in 2006, compared to 2.5% in 2005). The benign economic conditions and the stronger-
than-expected revenues have not been fully exploited to step up consolidation. Best practices from 
Member States show that fiscal institutions and appropriately designed fiscal rules can make a significant 
contribution to healthy fiscal policy and successful consolidation.  
A dynamic, smoothly functioning EMU (Chapter 2): Persistent growth and inflation differences and 
continuing large current account imbalances in some Member States indicate that adjustment within the 
euro area is sluggish. Country experiences provide useful insights into the important role in the adjustment 
process of the competitiveness channel, notably that this channel has not always worked optimally due to 
sluggish wage and price responsiveness. Real interest rates, fiscal policies and financial markets also play a 
key role in a country's adjustment process. Experience shows that it is important to pay attention to the 
interaction of all these different elements to avoid unduly large swings in output and employment. The 
Commission's Annual Progress Report (APR) noted in its euro-area fiche that Member States have 
undertaken positive steps to foster growth and employment. However, Member States seem to be 
insufficiently aware of the euro-area dimension in planning their structural reform. This chapter discusses 
in more depth what role financial market integration, product market reforms and appropriate wage 
developments could play in smoothing the adjustment process. 
The external dimension (Chapter 3): In 2006 the euro's real effective exchange rate appreciated by 3.5% 
in 2006, while bilateral movements vis-à-vis the US dollar and the yen were more pronounced. Global 
current account imbalances widened further in 2006. Given the risks this poses to the global economy, the 
IMF launched multilateral consultations on this issue. The euro has emerged as the second-most 
important international currency behind the US dollar. Given the increasing global role of the euro area, 
the institutional arrangements for its external representation remain inadequate although some 
improvements have been made recently. Furthermore, the EU's economic relationships with China, India 
and Russia are flourishing, making the macroeconomic dialogue and other forms of cooperation with 
these countries increasingly important.  
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1. MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
AND POLICIES 
1. Economic activity in the euro area gained 
momentum in 2006. The strengthening 
recovery triggered adjustment of 
macroeconomic policies. This chapter describes 
macroeconomic developments in 2006 and 
discusses some challenges that the euro area is 
confronted with at the macroeconomic level. 
Section 1.1 sets the scene, describing economic 
developments last year. Section 1.2 takes up 
issues of monetary policy. It presents monetary 
developments during 2006 and looks into 
services inflation in more detail. Turning to fiscal 
policy, section 1.3 starts with fiscal 
developments over the last year. Subsequently, 
consideration is given to factors that contribute 
to successful consolidation. The last section 
concludes.
1.1 MACROECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENTS
2. On 1 January 2007 the euro area welcomed 
its thirteenth member:  Slovenia.  Slovenia is 
the first of the ten Member States that joined the 
EU on 1 May 2004 to enter the euro area. After 
it reached a high degree of nominal convergence 
(as assessed by the Commission and the ECB1)
the Ecofin Council allowed Slovenia to adopt 
the euro as from 1 January 2007. 
3. The year 2006 saw a significant 
acceleration in economic activity in the euro 
area. Following fairly weak growth in the early 
phase of this cyclical upswing, GDP grew by 
2.7%, up from 1.4% in 2005. This was the best 
1 European Commission (2006), 'Convergence 
Report 2006 on Slovenia', May 2006; European 
Central Bank (2006), 'Convergence Report', May 
2006.
performance since 2000 and is clearly above the 
long-term average.  
4. Domestic demand was the main factor 
driving the remarkable growth performance.
After a sustained period of sluggishness, 
domestic demand picked up, reflecting buoyant 
investment spending and a turn-around in 
household spending (Graph 1.1). The former, 
which was rather subdued in the initial stages of 
the cycle, finally reached levels comparable to 
previous recoveries. This reflected favourable 
financing conditions, reduced spare capacity, and 
upbeat business confidence against the 
background of an improving outlook for 
growth.
Graph 1.1: Contribution to GDP growth, euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
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Box 1: SLOVENIA – THE THIRTEENTH EURO-AREA MEMBER STATE  
1. Slovenia has achieved a high degree of nominal convergence with the euro area. Average 
inflation declined to 2.5% in 2006. The general government deficit has stayed below 3% since 2002 and 
the debt has stayed slightly below 30% of GDP. During its participation in ERM II since June 2004, the 
tolar exchange rate stayed close to the central parity. The short-term interest rate differential vis-à-vis the 
euro disappeared by the end of October 2006. The spread for long-term interest rates has been close to 
zero since spring 2006. 
2. Slovenia's economy has converged rapidly to the euro area also in real terms. In 2006, Slovenian 
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) reached 79% of the euro area. Slovenia has 
maintained robust growth at around 4% since 2004, which accelerated to 5.2% in 2006. Labour 
productivity in Slovenia – now at approximately 75% of the euro-area average – is growing rapidly. 
Slovenia's labour market situation compares favourably with that of the euro area: Slovenia’s employment 
rate is above the euro-area average (66%) and its unemployment rate is lower (6.1%).  
3. The euro brings considerable benefits to Slovenian economy. The euro strengthens 
macroeconomic stability in Slovenia, which is a pre-condition for long-term economic growth and job 
creation. Slovenia also benefits from low interest rates in the euro area, which support investment and 
consumption. The lack of transaction costs and exchange-rate risk is beneficial for households and 
businesses: it is now easier and cheaper to travel and do business abroad, but it also makes Slovenia a 
more attractive trading and investment partner. This is a significant advantage as the Slovenian economy 
relies heavily on imports and exports.  
4. The advantages of the euro are accompanied by policy challenges. Firstly, the euro-area's 
common monetary policy calls for alternative adjustment mechanisms to safeguard competitiveness in the 
face of asymmetric economic shocks. Wage flexibility and high labour productivity growth are important 
in this regard. Secondly, fiscal policy plays an important role in a monetary union since sound public 
finances create sufficient room for the automatic stabilizers. In the longer term, sustainable public 
finances are crucial in view of the costs of an ageing population. Moreover, in a catching-up economy as 
Slovenia additional challenges might occur. It has to be ensured therefore that rapid real convergence 
associated with high credit growth and price-level convergence do not interfere with price stability and do 
not endanger Slovenia's competitiveness.  
Slovenia: convergence to the euro area 
(Index euro area=100)
Recent macroeconomic performance, Slovenia 
(annual percentage change) 
60
65
70
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80
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP in PPS
Labour productivity
Price level
2004 2005 2006
GDP growth 4.4 4 5.2
Inflation 3.7 2.5 2.5
Current account 
deficit (% of GDP) -2.6 -2 -1.9
Budget balance  
(% of GDP) -2.3 -1.4 -1.6
Source: Commission services. Source: Commission services. 
5. Slovenia is a small open economy. Slovenia contributes 0.4% to euro area GDP and 0.6% to its 
population. This Annual Report aims to include Slovenia in the euro area aggregates – also for the years 
before 2007 – wherever possible.
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5. Private consumption gathered pace last 
year, benefiting from solid labour market 
performance. The initially weaker development 
of private consumption compared to previous 
recoveries mirrored employment growth, which 
remained sluggish for several quarters after the 
turn-around in economic activity in mid-2003. In 
addition, wage growth remained subdued for a 
prolonged period in some euro-area Member 
States, particularly in Germany. This was 
welcome as a means to restore competitiveness. 
However, it also acted as a break on the growth 
of household income and, thereby, on private 
consumption.  In 2006, however, employment 
growth picked up significantly and contributed 
to a much more robust expansion of private 
consumption both by increasing the number of 
people in employment and by strengthening 
consumer confidence.  
6. Two million new jobs were created in the 
euro area in 2006. After moderate employment 
growth since 2002 the situation in the labour 
market improved considerably in 2006. 
Employment growth accelerated to around 1.5% 
in 2006 in the euro area, yielding an increase of 
close to 2 million new jobs.  Since the 
introduction of the euro more than 10 million 
jobs have been created in the euro area, more 
than in the USA over the same period. In 2006 
the unemployment rate dropped and reached 
7.3% in March 2007 (Graph 1.2), the lowest 
level in 15 years. While the fall in the 
unemployment rate is largely attributable to the 
strong cyclical upswing, available estimates also 
point to a clear fall in the structural rate of 
unemployment.2 It is currently estimated at 
around 7.8%, suggesting that earlier labour 
market reforms are starting to bear fruit. 
7. Exports contributed positively to GDP 
growth last year. Notably, in the fourth quarter 
exports grew very strongly across euro-area 
countries. As a result, net exports were the main 
contributor to euro-area growth in the last 
quarter of 2006. The impact of the appreciation 
of the euro during 2006 on euro-area export 
growth was thus fairly contained. This happened 
in spite of a slowdown in the economic activity 
of some key trading partners over the last year, 
particularly the USA, and  seems to be due to a 
2 The structural rate of unemployment reported here is 
based on DG ECFIN estimates of the NAWRU (the Non-
Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment). 
large extent to the broadening of world growth 
and the concomitant shift in the geographical 
composition of euro-area exports.  In particular, 
the euro area's trade exposure to the USA has 
declined in recent years and as a result the direct 
effect from the US slowdown remained limited 
(see Box 2). 
Graph 1.2: The euro-area labour market 
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Source: Commission services. 
8. Summing up, in 2006 the euro area 
witnessed a clear pick-up in economic 
activity.  While this reflects the strengthening of 
the cycle, some indicators suggest that structural 
improvements may also be under way.  This is, 
for instance, the case for developments in labour 
productivity (see Chapter 2) and estimates of the 
structural rate of unemployment.
9. Economic prospects for the euro area 
appear to be promising.  The strong and broad 
recovery in 2006 bodes well for 2007. Downside 
risks to the outlook seem to have diminished 
over the last year and the external environment 
is more supportive than expected. However, 
domestic demand, i.e. private consumption and 
investment, show most momentum and are 
expected to be the main driver of the ongoing 
recovery in 2007.3
3 More information on the outlook can be found in the 
economic forecasts published by the European 
Commission in spring and in autumn each year 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/euro
pean_economy/forecasts_en.htm). 
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Box 2:  THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A SLOWDOWN IN THE US ECONOMY  
1. The US economy is going through a temporary dip. Signs of a slowdown in the US economy have 
become evident in the course of 2006. The slowdown has its origin in the housing sector. The outlook for 
the US economy depends crucially on the speed at which the housing sector will cool down and on how 
strong the spill-over effects to the rest of the economy will be. So far, the slowdown has not affected 
other parts of the economy. Consumer spending is held up by wage and employment growth and 
supported by the recent fall in energy prices. Therefore, the risk of a "hard landing" in the USA appears 
low at the moment.  
2. The US impact on the euro area goes beyond the direct trade effect. Euro-area exports to the 
USA will be directly affected by a US slowdown. But because of the size of the US economy and the 
global role of the US dollar, there will also be an indirect trade effect. The economies of third countries 
will be affected by the US slowdown and euro-area exports to these countries might suffer as a result. 
Finally, the magnitude of the trade channel effects depends strongly on the responses of exchange rates to 
lower demand from the USA. In case of a depreciation of the dollar, the negative effect of a US slowdown 
on the euro-area economy via trade effects would be higher. However, the importance of the US market 
for the euro-area economy has decreased over time, reflecting the growing importance of the recently-
acceded Member States, oil-producing countries and Asia (see table). 
Table: Geographical distribution of euro-area 
exports of goods (%)
2000 2002 2004 2006
Industrialised
non-EA
55.6 54.2 51.1 47.8 
 DK, SE, UK 25.1 24.6 23.8 21.7 
 USA 17.2 16.9 14.9 14.4 
 Other (1) 13.3 12.7 12.4 11.6 
EU-11 (2) 14.5 15.3 16.7 18.5 
Candidate
countries (3) 
3.1 2.7 3.4 3.5 
CIS (4) 2.4 3.4 4.2 5.1 
Dev. Countries 24.3 24.4 24.6 25.1 
 MENA (5) 7.4 7.9 7.9 7.6 
 Sub-Saharan         
Africa 
2.7 2.7 2.6 2.8 
 Latin America 5.0 4.3 3.8 4.2 
 Asia 9.2 9.5 10.2 10.5 
(1) Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Australia, 
New Zealand. 
(2) 2004 and 2007 accession countries excluding Slovenia. 
(3) Croatia, Turkey, Former Yugoslavian Republic of 
Macedonia. 
(4) Commonwealth of Independent States. 
(5) Middle East and North Africa. 
Source: IMF. 
 3. A US slowdown would also have spill-over 
effects through corporate and financial 
linkages. The US activities of euro-area 
companies are considerable. A lower profitability 
of US affiliates would have an adverse effect on 
the balance sheets of the euro-area parent 
companies. This is likely to have an additional 
dampening effect on investment in the euro area. 
A reassessment of global risks, a shift in 
preferences of international investors and other 
financial linkages could also have an impact 
through financial asset prices. A stronger-than-
expected slowdown would likely lower the value 
of US assets, including those held by euro-area 
companies and households. This would dampen 
investment and consumption in the euro area. 
4. However, lower import prices and interest 
rates may mitigate the impact of the US 
slowdown on the euro-area economy. First, 
lower world demand growth will reduce global 
price pressures, thereby reducing import prices. 
This will impact real incomes, profit margins and 
the monetary policy. Second, a decline in the 
growth of domestic demand in the USA will lead 
to higher global savings, thereby exerting 
downward pressure on interest rates, supporting 
domestic demand in the euro area. 
5. There are a number of reasons why a US slowdown would have a more limited effect on euro-
area growth now than in 2001-2003. First, the slowdown in the USA has this time not been sparked by a 
common adverse shock as was the case in 2000-2001 (the dot-com bubble burst). Second, the relative 
importance of the USA for euro-area exporters has declined. Third, the slowdown in the USA is mainly 
affecting the construction and housing sector, while the import demand of investment goods should hold 
up comparatively well. Fourth, euro-area growth is expected to be increasingly based on domestic demand 
in the coming years. Favourable financing conditions, good employment growth and higher profitability 
all point to continued solid growth of domestic demand. Finally, structural reform efforts in past years 
may have contributed to stronger potential growth and thereby also to the resilience of the euro-area 
economy to external shocks. 
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1.2. MONETARY POLICY AND 
DEVELOPMENTS
10. Despite a surge in energy prices, inflation 
remained contained. Increasing energy prices 
kept headline HICP inflation above 2% until 
August 2006. Since then, the substantial drop in 
oil and energy prices in the subsequent months 
helped to bring inflation down below 2%.  For 
the year as a whole, headline HICP inflation 
averaged 2.2%, unchanged from the previous 
year.  In contrast, core inflation (HICP excluding 
energy and unprocessed food prices) remained 
fairly steady throughout the year at about 1.5%, 
suggesting the absence of significant second-
round effects from the energy price hikes 
(Graph 1.3). This is all the more significant as it 
took place in a situation of cyclical acceleration 
and strong labour demand. 
Graph 1.3: Headline and core inflation, euro area 
(Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices) 
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Source: Commission services. 
11. The gap between core and headline 
inflation narrowed in 2006.  Between late 2001 
and end-2004 headline and core inflation stayed 
at a comparable level. From late 2004 onwards, 
the difference widened on the back of the fall in 
core inflation components, in particular non-
energy industrial goods inflation and processed 
food inflation. In mid-2005 headline inflation 
rose sharply, pushed by the oil price hikes, and 
brought the gap between headline and core 
inflation to around 1 percentage point. Only in 
the course of 2006 did the gap narrow reflecting 
a sharp fall in headline inflation but also a slight 
rise in core inflation. Services inflation continues 
to make the highest and most persistent 
contribution to core inflation (for more 
discussion on services inflation see below). 
12. The ECB continued raising interest rates 
in 2006. Since December 2005, the ECB’s 
Governing Council has increased interest rates 
seven times, by a total of 175 basis points, to 
presently 3.75%. The last rate hike was decided 
in March 2007 (Graph 1.4). These decisions 
were motivated by upside risks to price stability, 
identified in both the economic and monetary 
analyses.  
Graph 1.4: ECB minimum bid rate and 3-month 
market rate 
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13. Monetary conditions in the euro area 
tightened somewhat last year. This was driven 
by the above-mentioned policy rate increases 
and the appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate of the euro by around 3.4% in 
2006. The appreciation was even more 
accentuated in nominal terms against major 
currencies (Graph 1.5). Exchange rate 
developments are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3.  
Graph 1.5: Euro exchange rates 
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Graph 1.6: Real interest rates in the euro area 
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14. Despite recent interest rate hikes, both 
real and nominal interest rates are still at low 
levels (Graph 1.6). The short-term interest rate 
is slowly approaching a level that might be 
considered to be neutral. Although the 
calculation of the neutral interest rate is 
associated with a high degree of uncertainty, 
most academic studies find a level between 2% 
and 3% for a real short-term neutral interest rate 
in the euro area. Recent analyses even suggest 
that the natural (real) rate in the euro area might 
have declined to slightly below 2%.4
Graph 1.7: Retail interest rates in the euro area 
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15. Other factors also point towards 
continuing favourable monetary and 
financing conditions. Although long-term 
interest rates climbed up throughout 2006, they 
are still at relatively low levels. Hence financing 
4 For an overview of recent studies on the neutral interest 
rate, see European Commission (2006), The EU Economy 
2006 Review, European Economy No. 6 2006, p. 126. 
conditions remain favourable. Retail long-term 
interest rates both for households and 
companies increased only slightly in 2006 
(Graph 1.7). Moreover, money and credit 
growth remain strong, and liquidity in the euro 
area is still ample by all plausible measures 
(Graph 1.8). 
Graph 1.8: Monetary developments in the euro area 
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More competition in services will lead to 
lower inflation. 
16. Services inflation has a high impact on 
overall consumer inflation. The overall 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
can be decomposed into its components to 
show price dynamics in different sectors of the 
euro-area economy. Energy inflation is by far the 
most variable component followed by 
unprocessed food. This explains why these two 
components are excluded in measures of core 
inflation. The other three components show 
more stability (Graph 1.9). Of these core 
components, services inflation has consistently 
made the highest contribution to overall 
inflation since 1999. Inflation in the services 
sector is in general higher than that in other 
sectors and is also higher than headline inflation. 
To some extent this can be explained by 
temporary factors such as reforms in health-care 
services or the rise in transportation costs due to 
oil price rises. However, the permanent 
character of higher inflation in services shows 
that structural factors are at work as well.  
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Graph 1.9: Contributions to euro-area HICP inflation 
(Annual percentage changes) 
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17. Services inflation is also persistent and 
contributes to inflation dispersion in the 
euro area. Services inflation is not only the 
highest but also the most persistent component 
of the HICP. Microeconomic research confirms 
that prices of services are stickier and adjust 
more slowly than prices of goods.5 At the 
country level, it has also been found that the 
services-industry inflation differential is 
correlated with the overall HICP inflation 
differential vis-à-vis the euro-area average.6 This 
means that countries with relatively high services 
inflation also tend to have overall inflation above 
the euro-area average, and vice-versa. This 
suggests that services inflation is an important 
contributor to inflation differentials among euro-
area countries.  
18. Slow productivity growth in services is 
the main cause of the high services inflation. 
For instance, productivity growth in industry 
averaged 2.3% and only 0.2% in services 
between 1999 and 2005.  This can in part be 
explained by the need for a face-to-face 
relationship between providers and consumers 
of many services, and less scope for 
technological change than in other sectors. 
Wages, meanwhile, have tended to equalise 
among sectors. Different productivity growth 
and similar wage growth have led to higher unit 
5 See Altissimo, F., M. Ehrmann and F. Smets (2006), 
"Inflation persistence and price setting in the euro area. A 
summary of the IPN evidence", ECB Occasional Paper, 
No. 46.
6 See Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the 
European System of Central Banks (2006), "Competition, 
productivity and prices in the euro area services sector", 
ECB Occasional Paper, No. 44.
labour costs in services and higher inflation in 
comparison to other sectors (see Chapter 2). The 
slow productivity growth in euro-area services 
stands out especially in comparison with the 
United States. It is widely recognised that the 
United States' productivity boom in the 1990s 
had its roots in the surge in productivity growth 
in the services sector, mainly in retail and in 
wholesale trade (see also section 2.1). The US 
experience also shows that the intrinsic slow 
productivity growth in services can be 
overcome.  
19. The limited competition in a number of 
service industries exacerbates the situation.
Besides the above-mentioned factors, the lack of 
competition is another explanation for weak 
productivity gains and price rigidity in a number 
of service industries. Many service sub-sectors 
are much less exposed to international (or even 
inter-regional) trade and foreign competition 
than goods. Many service sub-sectors are also 
still subject to overly constraining regulations. 
Restrictions on competition tend to reduce 
pressures to innovate and to put in place more 
effective production processes (see Chapter 2).  
20. Completion of the single market in 
services is important. The services sector is the 
largest sector in the euro-area economy. It 
represents around 70% of GDP and 
employment. More than 40% of consumers' 
expenditure is spent on services. Moreover, 
services also provide an important input for 
other sectors of the economy. Yet, despite their 
overwhelming importance in the euro-area 
economy, the completion of the single market in 
services has lagged behind. For instance, much 
progress can still be made in the area of public 
procurement. The problem of insufficient 
competition in services has been recognised by 
Member States, with the Lisbon Strategy calling 
for more competition in services markets and a 
fully operational internal market for services. 
This is also the aim of the new Services 
Directive (see Chapter 2). 
21. Competition-enhancing measures would 
help to reduce services inflation and overall 
inflation. By removing unnecessary regulatory 
restrictions at both state and regional levels, 
services markets would function better. National 
competition authorities need sufficient powers 
and resources, to monitor and prevent collusion, 
abuse of dominance and anticompetitive 
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mergers on services markets and, perhaps, to 
review the impact of services legislation on 
competition. Consumer protection laws and 
powers also have a role to play. Since wage 
rigidities are an important determinant of price 
stickiness in services, higher labour market 
flexibility and more wage differentiation between 
sectors would help keep wage developments 
aligned with productivity growth. The example 
of the USA suggests that more could be done to 
boost productivity in services. The spread of 
new technologies, in particular ICT, in services 
could improve productivity and thereby lower 
inflation in the sector. As explained in Chapter 2, 
a better functioning services market would not 
only contribute to low inflation, but would also 
raise the euro area's capacity to adjust to shocks.
1.3. FISCAL POLICY AND 
DEVELOPMENTS
22. Revenue surprises contributed to a fall in 
the fiscal deficit for the euro area as a whole.
In 2006 the nominal budget balance in the euro 
area improved. The deficit stood at 1.6% of 
GDP, down from 2.5% in 2005. This mainly 
reflected buoyant economic growth that led to 
better-than-expected budgetary revenue. The 
revenue-to-GDP ratio increased to 45.8% – 
higher than expected in early 2006. The level of 
budgetary expenditure was essentially stable but 
the expenditure-to-GDP ratio fell to 47.4% 
because of higher GDP growth.  
23. The current buoyancy of tax revenues 
has gone hand in hand with a sharp rise of 
tax elasticities.  Tax elasticities were well below 
their average in the past economic slowdown. 
Their current rise reflects a number of factors 
such as a steep recovery of corporate profits, 
rising oil prices, a recovery of tax-rich domestic 
consumption expenditure, a positive 
performance of equity markets and, in some 
countries, -rising house prices. 
24. The fiscal stance was broadly neutral in 
2006. The fiscal policy stance can be 
approximated by changes in the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) that shows the 
budgetary correction net of cyclical factors and 
interest payments. 2006 saw a broadly neutral 
stance after a moderate tightening in 2005. In 
2006 the CAPB increased slightly, by 0.3%, 
which falls short of the 0.5% benchmark 
improvement envisaged for "good times" by the 
revised Stability and Growth Pact. The 
consolidation effort was also much lower than in 
2005 in spite of the much better economic 
situation (Graph 1.10).7
25. In some countries there is a risk of a pro-
cyclical policy. The slower pace of fiscal 
adjustment in the euro area stems mainly from 
the deterioration of structural balances in 
countries that have already achieved their 
medium-term objectives (MTO). Given the 
good economic performance, a looser fiscal 
stance might result in pro-cyclical fiscal policies 
in those countries and contribute to overheating 
of the economy. Moreover, the structural 
adjustment in 2007 is expected to remain below 
0.5%, suggesting that Member States do not take 
full advantage of the current good economic 
conditions.  
Graph 1.10: Fiscal policy stance in the euro area 
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26. There are worrying similarities between 
the current situation and the past recovery.
The current configuration of rapid economic 
growth and positive surprises in tax revenue 
closely resembles the situation that prevailed at 
the turn of the decade. Major policy mistakes 
were made then. In 1999-2001, several Member 
States did not make use of the good economic 
conditions to achieve healthy public finances. 
These countries subsequently found themselves 
in an uncomfortable position when the cycle 
entered a less favourable phase. The absence of 
budgetary margins to let automatic stabilisers 
7 Graph 1.10 up to Graph 1.12 (and references in the 
text to the figures presented there) are based on the 
interim economic forecasts. New data will be 
available in May 2007.   
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operate resulted in either a breach of the 
reference value, or pro-cyclical fiscal policy, or 
both. The inappropriate fiscal stance of those 
years has been widely recognised as being at the 
roots of the difficulties with the implementation 
of the original Stability and Growth Pact. 
27. The policy mistakes of 1999-2001 should 
be avoided. It is essential that the spirit of the 
2005 SGP reform be upheld in the current 
benign economic environment. The revised Pact 
contains clear provisions on the need to 
strengthen consolidation efforts when growth 
conditions are favourable, with particular 
reference to tax revenue. In such periods, 
Member States which have not yet reached 
sound fiscal positions are expected to strive for 
significant improvements in their structural 
balance.  
28. Currently, four euro-area Member States 
have excessive deficits: Germany, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal. On 30 January 2007, the 
Council decided that the excessive deficit 
procedure against France should be closed as its 
budget deficit remained below 3% also in 2006. 
In Germany, the economic recovery has helped 
to bring the budget deficit below 3% of GDP 
one year ahead of schedule. In Greece, there has 
been a strong correction in 2006 which has led 
the budget deficit to remain at 2.6% of GDP. 
Portugal and Italy have also recorded a 
significant structural improvement in 2006, 
masked in the case of the latter by the effect of 
one-off measures. 
Graph 1.11: Current structural balance and 
medium-term objective (MTO) 
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29. Most Member States have set their 
MTOs at levels consistent with the 
principles of the reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact.  Some countries have set more 
ambitious targets, exceeding the minimum levels 
required, mainly for consistency with their 
national strategy to face sustainability challenges 
(Graph 1.11). In most Member States the 
current structural balances still differ 
significantly from the MTO. Three broad groups 
of Member States can be identified (Graph 1.12): 
(i)  Member States which had already achieved 
their MTOs recorded deteriorations in their 
structural balances in 2006.  
(ii) Member States with a deficit of below 3% of 
GDP which had not yet reached their MTOs 
posted a fiscal adjustment of less than the 
0.5% of GDP benchmark in 2006. The 
adjustment effort is planned to be stepped 
up in 2007 and 2008.
(iii) Member States with deficits of above 3% of 
GDP have, on average, planned significant 
consolidation efforts over the years 2006-
2008.
Graph 1.12: Change in the structural balance of 
euro-area Member States 
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30. On 20 April 2007, the Eurogroup adopted 
orientations for fiscal policies in euro area 
Member States, recalling the commitment to 
actively consolidate public finances in good 
times and to use unexpected extra revenues 
for deficit and debt reduction. With a view to 
improving the coordination of fiscal policies in 
the euro area, euro area Finance Ministers 
discussed national budgetary developments in 
2007 and the preliminary policy outlook for 
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2008 and their implications for the euro area. 
Firstly, they committed to build on the better-
than-expected budgetary outcomes in 2006 and 
to pursue more ambitious budgetary targets than 
those set in the 2006 Stability Programmes. 
Secondly, they agreed to implement budgets for 
2007 as planned, avoiding expenditure overruns, 
and using unexpected extra revenues to reduce 
government deficit and debt. Thirdly, it was 
agreed that fiscal policy plans for 2008 should be 
carefully designed so as to accelerate adjustment 
towards the medium-term budgetary objectives 
for Member States which have not reached it 
and for those which have reached it to avoid 
fuelling macroeconomic imbalances. 
Achieving successful fiscal consolidation 
31. Sound fiscal policy remains a necessary 
pre-condition for sustained growth, 
investment and employment creation. Low
budget deficits and government debt foster low 
and stable inflationary expectations and help 
maintain low interest rates. Unsustainable public 
finances in one Member State could lead to 
higher interest rates and financial instability in 
the rest of the euro area. Hence, sound fiscal 
policy supports a stability-oriented monetary 
policy and is a prerequisite for the success of the 
monetary union. Against this backdrop, fiscal 
consolidation is essential for countries with a 
high deficit and a high debt level. Fiscal 
consolidation then also creates room for 
manoeuvre for the working of automatic 
stabilisers.
32. Consolidation helps to face the budgetary 
challenge of ageing. Country-specific strategies 
are needed to face the upcoming massive impact 
of ageing on public finances. Age-related public 
expenditure in the euro area, which includes 
spending on pensions, healthcare and long-term 
care, is projected to increase on average by 
around 4% of GDP by 2050 under a no-policy 
change scenario. This, however, masks a variety 
of situations across euro area Member States, 
with some at risk of double digit increases over 
the next decades. Ideally, the country-specific 
strategies contain measures to reduce budget 
deficits and debt, as well as structural reforms to 
face the prospective increase of expenditure 
items related to ageing populations (pensions, 
healthcare and long-term care). It is crucial that 
Member States that have not attained their 
MTOs make rapid progress towards reaching 
them. In this context the present favourable 
cyclical conditions provide a window of 
opportunity of speeding up fiscal consolidation.  
33. The success of fiscal consolidation 
depends on a number of factors. Effective
fiscal consolidation can be defined as a relatively 
sharp improvement in a country's primary 
budget balance net of cyclical factors that is 
implemented over a given number of years. A 
consolidation episode is deemed to have been 
successful if the fiscal correction is sustained in 
time.  Empirical evidence suggests that a number 
of specific factors increase the likelihood of 
success.  The first group of factors relates to the 
composition of the adjustment, the economic 
environment and political factors. The second 
group relates to institutional factors such as 
fiscal rules. 
Composition, economic conditions and 
other factors 
34. Expenditure-based consolidations tend 
to be more successful. One of the most 
important factors affecting the success rate of 
fiscal consolidation is its composition. The 
potential for a durable budgetary adjustment is 
typically larger when driven by restraint in 
expenditure than when relying on higher 
revenue. There is also an additional benefit in 
terms of economic effects. Compared to 
revenue-based corrections, expenditure-based 
consolidations tend to have a less restrictive or 
even an expansionary impact on the economy. 
Cases in point are Spain in 1996-1997, the 
Netherlands, and Ireland in the early and mid-
1990s and Finland in the mid- and late 1990s. 
This can be explained by a number of factors, of 
which three are mentioned here: 
x Spending curbs are more likely than 
revenue increases to trigger lower 
interest rates (as revenue increases may 
have adverse effects on costs and 
prices); this in turn may lead to higher 
consumption and investment and finally 
have a positive impact on real GDP 
growth.
x Expenditure cuts can create room for 
tax cuts, which in turn have beneficial 
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effects on wage-bargaining, investment, 
consumption and growth. 
x Governments which tackle high 
expenditure demonstrate a commitment 
that paves the way for further 
substantial consolidation. 
As regards the type of expenditure, adjustments 
that primarily rely on cuts in transfers and the 
government wage bill have a better chance of 
being successful than cuts in public investment, 
which are very often reversed and do not usually 
have any positive impact on output growth.  
35. In practice, consolidation episodes are 
composed of both revenue and expenditure 
measures. When budgetary consolidation is 
brought about via one-off measures the chances 
of success are usually slim. In practice, many 
successful consolidation episodes involved a 
combination of revenue and expenditure 
measures. These often take the form of so-called 
switching strategies: the government begins the 
fiscal consolidation process by increasing taxes 
and/or cutting investment, and subsequently 
tackles the more politically sensitive current 
expenditures. 
36. Economic factors influence the success 
of consolidations. Firstly, initial conditions play 
a significant role. Large initial deficits tend to 
prompt fiscal consolidation and are also 
positively correlated with the size, intensity, and 
length of the consolidation episode. The size of 
the fiscal correction is also enhanced by higher, 
rather than lower, interest rates. The role of 
economic growth is somewhat more complex. 
Consolidation episodes in weaker economic 
conditions often take longer and make only a 
relatively small annual correction. However, the 
overall improvement in the budget balance tends 
to be higher. In a similar vein, cautious forecasts 
of GDP growth (and implicitly of tax revenue) 
promote consolidation by reducing the 
probability of negative growth surprises and 
revenue shortfalls.  
37. Structural reforms and political factors 
also play a significant role. Fiscal 
consolidation is generally more durable and 
hence more successful when it is accompanied 
by structural reforms that improve the public 
finances in the long run. Consolidation is 
boosted in situations in which both the 
population as a whole and all interest groups 
involved fully realise the need for reforms. Thus 
successful consolidations and any underlying 
reforms are commonly supported by strong 
political leadership by the Prime Minister and/or 
Finance Minister. They are also assisted by clear 
communication to the public via politicians, 
think tanks, and the media. Painful changes are 
often publicly justified by reference to the 
objective of preserving the welfare state. A case 
in point was Sweden in the early and mid-1990s.  
Fiscal governance and fiscal rules 
38. Fiscal policies in industrialised countries 
have not always been optimal. The economic 
literature provides abundant analysis of how 
taxes, government expenditure and government 
balance should be set over the business cycle for 
fiscal policy to be considered optimal and 
sustainable. However, experience shows that 
policy-makers have not always acted in line with 
these prescriptions. This has resulted in large 
and persistent deficits and growing public debts. 
Fiscal policy has also often turned out to be pro-
cyclical, particularly in good economic times, in 
spite of the broad agreement that a neutral or 
counter-cyclical stance would be preferable.  
39. Institutional settings contribute 
significantly to sound fiscal policies. There 
has been growing consensus in recent years 
among economists and policy-makers that the 
sources of the “deficit bias” and the “pro-
cyclical bias” in the conduct of fiscal policy are 
rooted in the “political economy”. They include 
factors such as the system of incentives and 
rewards that shape the behaviour of fiscal 
authorities. 
40. The Council has recently emphasized the 
importance of strengthening fiscal 
governance in the Member States. Both the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact stress 
the importance of national rules and institutions 
for budgetary discipline. In its report of 
20 March 2005 on the reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, the Council stated that 
"national budgetary rules should be complementary to the 
Member States’ commitments under the Stability and 
Growth Pact". The Council further underlined 
that domestic governance arrangements should 
complement the EU framework, and that 
national institutions could play a more 
prominent role in budgetary surveillance. 
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41. Various institutional elements can reduce 
spending and deficit biases. First, procedural 
rules laid down in law or in the constitution 
govern the implementation of the annual budget 
law and fix the respective powers of the various 
actors. Second, numerical fiscal rules, which fix 
targets and ceilings for fiscal aggregates or set 
benchmarks for the conduct of fiscal policy, can 
limit the discretion of fiscal authorities that are 
prone to deficit bias. Third, independent fiscal 
institutions (e.g. fiscal councils) can play a valuable 
role by providing inputs or recommendations on 
fiscal policy issues.  
42. Numerical fiscal rules can play a useful 
role. Such rules can be defined in many different 
ways. For instance, they can introduce limits on 
the deficit or debt of different government 
entities (budget balance and debt rules). The limits 
can be set on a yearly basis or on average over a 
given period. Alternatively, they can set 
benchmarks for the evolution of some categories 
of government expenditure (expenditure rules) or 
predefine the allocation of certain categories of 
tax revenue (revenue rules). Numerical fiscal rules 
can be more or less strong. Fiscal rules 
enshrined in the constitution or in other forms 
of law and subject to strict monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, can impose binding 
limits on the conduct of fiscal policy. While still 
allowing some room for discretion in policy-
making, they can directly contribute to fiscal 
discipline. Numerical fiscal rules based on 
political commitments or informal agreements 
between different tiers of general government 
can also have a positive impact on the conduct 
of fiscal policy. Such rules provide benchmarks 
against which fiscal policy can be assessed by the 
public, and can effectively contribute to policy 
coordination between different levels of 
government.
 43. Euro-area Member States increasingly 
rely on numerical fiscal rules. According to a 
survey conducted by the European Commission 
in 2005, the number of fiscal rules in force in the 
euro-area Member States has increased 
continuously over the last fifteen years (Graph 
1.13). There has been an interesting evolution in 
the government sub-sectors covered by 
numerical fiscal rules. While the existence of 
numerical fiscal rules at local and regional level 
was already frequent in the early nineties, an 
increasing number of numerical fiscal rules has 
since been introduced at central government 
level. A relatively recent feature is the 
introduction of numerical fiscal rules in the 
social security sector and rules covering the 
whole of the general government sector. Such 
developments may be a response to the 
introduction of the EU fiscal rules, which 
impose requirements for the general government 
deficit and debt, and to the increasing spending 
pressures in the social security sector.  
Graph 1.13: Number of numerical fiscal rules in force 
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Graph 1.14: Statutory base of fiscal rules at different 
levels of general government 
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44. The characteristics of the rules vary with 
the level of government. According to the 
same survey by the European Commission, rules 
applied to regional and local governments 
generally rely on annual schemes. In contrast, 
rules concerning the general government and 
central government sectors have a longer time 
horizon. These rules generally play a key role in 
those Member States where the annual budget 
process is embedded in a comprehensive 
medium-term budgetary framework. The 
statutory basis of numerical fiscal rules also 
seems to depend on the level of government.  
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The large majority of numerical fiscal rules 
applied to local and regional levels of 
governments are enshrined in law or the 
constitution. Rules concerning central 
government and the whole of the general 
government sector are, on the other hand, 
generally based on forms of political agreement 
– e.g. internal stability pacts or other forms of 
political agreement or commitment (Graph 1.14) 
45. Rules applied at local levels of 
government generally have stronger 
monitoring and enforcement procedures. A
crucial characteristic of fiscal rules is the nature 
of the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
Automatic correction or sanction procedures in 
the event or risk of non-compliance tend to 
favour respect of rules. Regular monitoring of 
compliance by an independent authority is also 
important. Such monitoring and enforcement 
procedures are, on average, applied more often 
at local and regional government levels than at 
higher levels of government (Graph 1.15). 
However, the apparent weaker status of the 
latter may be compensated by more public 
attention and media interest. High media 
visibility of a fiscal rule can be expected to 
contribute to its enforcement, through higher 
reputation costs in the event of non-compliance. 
Graph 1.15: Enforcement mechanisms of numerical 
fiscal rules in force in 2005 
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46. Empirical evidence suggests that a larger 
reliance on numerical rules can help to 
reduce deficits. The European Commission's 
report 'Public Finances in EMU – 2006' shows 
that there is a relation between the size of 
government deficits and the reliance on 
numerical fiscal rules. Over the last fifteen years, 
the cyclically-adjusted primary balance has on 
average improved in the years following the 
introduction of numerical fiscal rules. Another 
key result is that an increase in the share of 
government finances covered by numerical fiscal 
rules seems to lead, ceteris paribus, to lower 
deficits or higher surpluses (Graph 1.16). The 
analysis in the above-mentioned report also 
confirms the effectiveness of expenditure rules 
in addressing a possible spending bias. In 
particular, the decline in the ratio of primary 
government expenditure adjusted for the cycle 
was significantly larger after the introduction or 
strengthening of expenditure rules. In addition, 
the introduction of an expenditure rule helped to 
secure a primary balance large enough to 
stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio. As for revenue 
rules, rules on how to use extra revenues 
stemming from windfall gains under cyclically 
favourable conditions (which could involve the 
setting-up of stabilisation funds) can be 
instrumental in achieving fiscal consolidation.  
Graph 1.16: Relation between numerical fiscal rules 
and budgetary outcomes 
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47. The impact of numerical fiscal rules on 
budgetary outcomes depends on their 
design. On average, rules enshrined in law or 
the constitution, and provided with well-defined 
enforcement mechanisms that can be activated 
by independent authorities seem to have a 
greater influence on budgetary outcomes. 
However, other, less formal, rules can also 
positively influence budgetary outcomes. There 
are several examples of rules which are not 
enshrined in law or in the constitution, but are 
based on strong political commitments (e.g. 
coalition agreements), that have had a clear 
influence on budgetary developments and played 
a key role in fiscal consolidation strategies. 
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Graph 1.17: Cyclical behaviour of primary government 
expenditure
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48. The nature and design of numerical 
fiscal rules is also important for the cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy. Some economists 
have argued that overly strict numerical rules 
may hamper the stabilisation function of fiscal 
policy. Therefore, it is crucial how rules are 
defined. Rules that exclude cyclically-sensitive 
items or that are applied "over the cycle" may 
actually reduce the risk of pro-cyclicality in fiscal 
policy. Moreover, multi-year expenditure rules or 
frameworks can effectively curb the tendency for 
expenditure to grow faster during economic 
good times. In the same way, "rainy-day funds" 
or numerical fiscal rules that pre-define the 
allocation of possible revenue windfalls are 
valuable. They can help governments to credibly 
commit not to spend or give away via tax cuts 
better-than-expected tax revenue during good 
times. Such rules therefore can be instrumental 
in avoiding pro-cyclical policies as can be seen 
from the empirical evidence. Countries in which 
numerical fiscal rules are properly designed in 
order not to hamper the stabilisation function of 
fiscal policy tend to have a more counter-cyclical 
fiscal stance. Empirical analysis also confirms the 
positive properties of expenditure rules. Pro-
cyclical behaviour of expenditure in good times 
is less frequent in countries with strong 
expenditure rules (Graph 1.17).  
49. Overall, national fiscal rules can play an 
important role in supporting fiscal 
consolidation while helping avoid pro-
cyclical policies. The desirable characteristics 
of fiscal rules depend on domestic 
circumstances. There is no "one-size-fits-all" 
design. However, it appears that a number of 
features support the effectiveness of national 
fiscal rules. As highlighted by the Ecofin Council 
in its conclusions adopted on 10 October 2006, 
fiscal rules, to be effective, should benefit from 
strong national ownership as well as from a clear 
political commitment by all levels of government 
and parliament.  
1.4. CONCLUSIONS 
50. The euro-area economy is benefiting 
from a strong recovery. The upturn is now well 
established and broadly based among sectors. 
Domestic demand picked up strongly in 2006, as 
private consumption was boosted by the solid 
performance of the labour market. Risks to the 
outlook are mainly on the upside.   
51. The robust recovery has made an 
adjustment of the policy mix appropriate. 
Accordingly, the ECB has been increasing 
interest rates in 2006 and in the early months of 
2007. Although monetary conditions have 
become somewhat tighter in the light of these 
interest rate increases and the appreciation of the 
euro exchange rate, monetary and financial 
conditions have remained favourable. Fiscal 
policy has been only marginally adjusted so far, 
with more remaining to be done in view of the 
still-high debt levels and the budgetary 
challenges of ageing. Better-than-expected 
revenue led to a slight fall in the euro-area's 
fiscal deficit and the fiscal stance became 
somewhat tighter. However, several Member 
States failed to make full use of the improved 
economic situation. Some countries that have 
achieved their medium-term objectives run the 
risk of procyclical policies. Moreover, some 
Member States that have not yet achieved their 
MTO failed to achieve the required structural 
adjustment of 0.5% of GDP. On the positive 
side, it is noteworthy that the largest part of 
fiscal adjustment in the euro area comes from 
Member States with excessive deficits.
52. Measures to reduce services inflation 
would enhance the scope for an 
accommodative monetary policy. Inflation 
rates came down in the last months of 2006 and 
are expected to remain moderate over 2007 and 
2008. Services inflation continues to be the 
largest and the most persistent component of 
core inflation. This is due to low overall labour 
productivity growth – combined with the often 
high labour intensity and insufficient wage 
differentiation between sectors – and the 
barriers to competition in many services sectors. 
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Addressing these deficiencies would contribute 
to lower inflation.
53. Best practices from Member States show 
how successful fiscal consolidation is best 
achieved. Expenditure-based consolidations 
appear to be more successful than revenue-based 
consolidation. To succeed with consolidation, it 
also helps to create national ownership for the 
process and to show strong political leadership. 
Institutional settings can significantly contribute 
to sound fiscal policies. Many euro-area Member 
States are successfully making use of numerical 
rules in their fiscal policies. When designing 
these rules, it is important to keep in mind: 
(i) how these rules can best contribute to 
favourable budgetary outcomes, (ii) which level 
of government they apply to, and (iii) how pro-
cyclical outcomes can be avoided. 
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2. A DYNAMIC, SMOOTHLY 
FUNCTIONING EMU
54. While a smooth adjustment to economic 
disturbances is of central importance to 
EMU, more progress is needed. The benign 
economic environment provides a good 
opportunity to make further progress. 
Section 2.1 examines divergences in growth, 
inflation and current accounts. First lessons 
from adjustment in the euro area are presented 
in section 2.2. Section 2.3 highlights recent 
positive developments in structural reform under 
the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs and in 
productivity growth. Finally, sections 2.4, 2.5 
and 2.6 look at the role of financial markets, 
product markets and labour markets 
respectively, within the adjustment process. 
Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.1 ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 
IN THE EURO AREA 
REMAINS SLUGGISH 
55. Growth differences exhibit some 
persistence in the euro area. Growth 
differences between euro-area Member States 
already existed before 1999 and have tended to 
persist, though not to any markedly different 
extent. Since 1999, annual growth in Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal has nearly 
always been below the euro-area growth average, 
while Greece, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Finland consistently recorded above-average 
growth rates (Graph 2.1). The remaining 
euro-area countries grew by close to the average. 
These growth differences have persisted during 
the whole period, but narrowed somewhat in 
2006 due to the strengthening of the German 
economy and improvements in the Italian 
economy. Overall, what is noticeable is that 
these growth differences persist, even though 
the euro-area countries have become much more 
integrated and business cycles have become 
more closely aligned.  
Graph 2.1: Annual GDP growth in the euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
56. Inflation differentials in the euro area are 
low but also tend to be persistent. From a 
historical perspective, inflation dispersion clearly 
dropped in the run-up to EMU, from around 
5-6 percentage points at the beginning of the 
nineties to less than 2 percentage points in 1999. 
In EMU's first two years dispersion increased 
somewhat, but it returned to low levels 
afterwards (see graph 2.2). However, inflation 
differences among euro-area Member States 
have tended to persist. Six Member States, 
namely Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Slovenia, were found to be persistently 
above the average, while the other three –
Germany, France and Austria– were persistently 
below. Only four Member States, i.e. Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Finland and the Netherlands, 
recorded periods of both positive and negative 
differentials vis-à-vis the euro-area average over 
the period 1999-2006.  
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57. Persistent differences in growth and 
inflation originate in a number of factors.
Differences in growth and inflation should not 
be a source for concern per se if they reflect 
different positions in the cycle or if the main 
reason for such a divergence was a one-off 
event. However, there were other factors behind 
the persistence phenomenon in this case, the 
three main ones being as follows. First, initial 
conditions matter. The strong decline in interest 
rates in the run-up to EMU in some countries 
inflated consumption and investment such as in 
real estate. These developments were fuelled to a 
certain extent by financial exuberance and the 
credit cycle. Second, prices and wages were too 
slow to adjust to national cyclical conditions, 
with wage flexibility, which is conducive to the 
reallocation of factors of production, remaining 
particularly insufficient. Third, some budgetary 
policies were pro-cyclical and failed to achieve 
the necessary fiscal consolidation (see Chapter 
1). As a result of these three elements, national 
business cycles were amplified.
Graph 2.2: Inflation dispersion for euro-area Member 
States HICPs 
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Source: Commission services. 
58. Persistent current account differences 
suggest that competitiveness adjustments 
are slow. The dispersion of current account 
balances within the euro area has widened 
significantly since the late nineties. This is a 
result of the sharp deterioration of current 
account deficits in Greece, Portugal, and Spain 
and – to a lesser degree – of the markedly rising 
surpluses in Finland, Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands (which have seen improvements in 
their current account position of respectively 5.5, 
4 and 3.4 percentage points, see Graph 2.3). At 
the same time, the external balance of countries 
already in deficit at the start of EMU did not 
rebound. Portugal saw no improvement in the 
period 1999-2006 and still records a deficit of 
close to 9% of GDP, and the current account 
position of Spain and Greece deteriorated 
between 1999 and 2006 by 6 and 2.8 percentage 
points respectively.  
Graph 2.3: Current account balances for selected 
euro-area Member States 
(in % of GDP) 
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The widening dispersion of current account 
positions within the euro area is due to a 
combination of causes. Differences in cyclical 
positions had some impact, albeit rather modest. 
Deeper financial integration, mostly related to 
the European integration and the euro, played a 
stronger role. It allowed a cut in the risk 
premium and a loosening of credit constraints. 
This enlarged the borrowing capacity of the 
private sector in Greece, Portugal and Spain. As 
these three countries have lower per capita 
income than the euro-area average, financial 
deepening has made it possible to meet their 
potentially higher financing needs through 
additional foreign capital flows. A third 
explanation for the dispersion of current 
accounts stresses competitiveness changes. 
Although changes in competitiveness and 
therefore in the current account balance are 
needed to adjust to a shock, the extent and 
duration of these changes reveal some structural 
inefficiencies. In particular in Spain and 
Portugal, losses in competitiveness have been 
compounded by the sluggish response of wages 
in the face of a sharp productivity slowdown. 
Overall, whereas current account differences can 
still be reabsorbed without significant 
consequences in the longer term, the rebalancing 
process will need to be followed carefully in the 
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coming years from both an analytical and a 
policy perspective. 
59. Slow adjustment is compounded by low 
productivity growth. Slower productivity 
growth lowers the economy's potential growth 
and means that the correction of an accumulated 
competitiveness gap takes longer. Restoring 
competitiveness means a downward adjustment 
of unit labour costs, which are determined by 
the evolution of nominal wages and productivity. 
A failure to achieve higher productivity growth 
thus means that nominal wages will have to bear 
the brunt of the adjustment. 
Graph 2.4: Labour productivity in the euro area 
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60. Historical data from the new EU KLEMS 
database confirm weak productivity growth.
The EU KLEMS project builds a system of 
analysis at the industry level for the EU Member 
States (as well as the US and Japan) which 
encompasses internationally harmonised 
statistics, as well as a growth accounting 
analytical framework.8 The comparison of 
average growth figures from the period 1970-
1995 to the period 1995-2004 indicates that 
labour productivity growth decelerated for all 
euro-area Member States except Ireland and 
8 This project, funded under the 6th Research Framework 
Programme of the European Commission, will eventually 
cover over 60 industries, with 25-30 countries, up to 35 
years of data and between 60-70 variables and indicators 
included. The first results were released in March 2007. The 
EU KLEMS database could be accessed at: 
www.euklems.net.
Greece.9 While annual productivity growth 
decelerated from 2.4% to 1.3% in the euro area 
between the two periods, it accelerated from 
1.3% to 2.4% in the United States (Graph 2.4). 
Graph 2.5: Labour productivity in the euro area 
7-sector breakdown 
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Source: Commission services and EU KLEMS database. 
61. Wider positive spillovers from the 
acceleration of productivity in the high-tech 
sector have not been visible. Evidence 
suggests that information and communication 
technologies (ICT) play a significant role in the 
revival of productivity in advanced countries. 
But although productivity accelerated markedly 
in the ICT-producing sector10 of the euro area in 
the 1995-2004 period, its contribution to 
aggregate euro-area productivity figures 
remained small (Graph 2.5). This is due to its 
low share in total output and the absence of 
discernable productivity spillovers to other 
sectors (Table 2.1). In fact, productivity 
decelerated in manufacturing and all services 
sub-sectors.
62. Trends in total factor productivity (TFP) 
confirm this picture. TFP can be defined as the 
capability to combine efficiently labour and 
capital in the productive process11. In all euro-
9 Data for Slovenia are available only from 1995 on. 
10 Proxied here by the ELECOM sector. 
11 TFP reflects the joint effects of many factors including 
research and development (R&D), new technologies, 
economies of scale, managerial skill, and changes in the 
organisation of production. 
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area countries except Finland and the 
Netherlands, the contribution of TFP to output 
growth has decreased (Graph 2.6). In Italy, Spain 
and Luxembourg TFP-growth even turned 
negative. Beyond these lacklustre developments, 
there are grounds for hope. First, some euro-
area countries, such as Finland and the 
Netherlands, owed their better performance to a 
significant acceleration of TFP in the ICT-
producing sector and in distribution services. 
Thus in these countries some form of spillover, 
albeit limited to one sector, may have 
materialised. Second, the recent rebound in 
productivity growth could be more than just 
cyclical in nature (see Section 2.3). 
Table 2.1: Contribution to labour productivity growth 
(in percentage points)
Euro area United States 
1980-
1995 
1995-
2004 
1980-
1995 
1995-
2004 
Total industries 2.4 1.3 1.3 2.4 
ELECOM 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 
MexElec 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 
OtherG 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 
DISTR 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.9 
FINBU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
PERS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
NONMAR 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Note: In the period 1980-1995, reallocation of labour contributes 
to 0.1 percentage point in the euro area and to -0.1 point in the US. 
Source: Commission services and EU KLEMS database. 
Graph 2.6: Total factor productivity in the euro area 
Member States, market economy 
(Average annual growth in %) 
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1995 for France. Only the data for 1995-2004 are available for 
Slovenia.  
Source: Commission services and EU KLEMS database. 
2.2 FIRST LESSONS FROM THE 
EURO AREA'S ADJUSTMENT 
PROCESS
63. The euro area has an even greater stake 
in successful structural reform than the EU.
Whereas the European Union as a whole needs 
reforms to boost its growth potential and 
stimulate job creation, the euro-area, being a 
monetary union, should pay even more attention 
to such reforms as they enhance internal 
adjustment through market flexibility. The first 
years of EMU provide a number of country-
specific experiences that are especially useful in 
this regard. Since 1999, the euro area has had to 
face several episodes of economic turbulences 
(bursting of the dot-com bubble, 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, high volatility of oil prices). In addition, 
the economic impact of the run-up to EMU had 
differentiated effects among euro-area Member 
States before 1999, and these effects persisted 
after 1999. All these elements enable policy-
makers to better understand how the adjustment 
process has worked in practice and to draw 
tentative conclusions.
64. Competitiveness is the main channel for 
adjustment. Theoretically, above-average 
demand in a given country should push costs 
and prices upwards. The deterioration in the 
relative cost situation should then worsen that 
country's cost and price competitiveness and 
slow the pace of economic activity towards the 
euro-area average. The experience of the 
Netherlands during 1997 to 2005 illustrates that 
this adjustment process has worked in practice 
(see Box 3 for country examples). At times of 
country-specific weakness the reverse would 
occur if real prices and wages are flexible 
downwards.
65. However, the real-interest rate channel 
can complicate adjustment. Real interest rates 
in euro-area Member States tend to fall as 
inflation accelerates in a boom, and to increase 
during a slowdown. This may amplify swings in 
output and inflation in the short and medium 
term. Such effects are inherent to some degree in 
all monetary unions. As shifts in competitiveness 
get underway, real interest rates at the national 
level can affect the adjustment path in a perverse 
(i.e. pro-cyclical) direction. 
66. Evidence shows that adjustment in the 
euro area is working but could be slow.
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According to a Commission model12, the 
adjustment process in the euro area is 
dynamically stable, because the balancing effects 
of the competitiveness channel are stronger than 
the unbalancing impact of the real interest rate 
channel. However, the adjustment can be quick 
or slow. It could even led to overshooting, when 
corrective action is pursued beyond what is 
needed (Graph 2.7). 
Graph 2.7: Potential patterns of adjustment in a 
monetary union 
Source: Commission services. 
67. In some cases sluggish price and wage 
responsiveness have impaired adjustment.
Wage behaviour, taken together with underlying 
trends in productivity, has an important 
influence on the efficiency of adjustment 
process. Significant divergences exist in the 
extent to which wages and prices have 
responded to changes in national output gaps. 
Some countries have experienced sluggish wage 
adjustment, compounded by low downward real 
price flexibility. Thus adjustment through 
changes in competitiveness may be slow, 
resulting in a less efficient adjustment process 
and larger swings in output and employment (see 
section 2.6 for further analysis.) 
68. Financial markets have played an 
important role in the adjustment process.
Financial markets encourage risk-sharing and 
can help to smooth the effect of an economic 
shock. The decline in risk premia and the easing 
of credit constraints have opened up new 
economic opportunities, including higher scope 
for household borrowing. But financial markets 
12 European Commission (2006), "Market adjustment, the 
competitive channel", Chapter 4 in "Dynamic Adjustment 
in the Euro area: Experiences and challenges", EU 
Economy Review 2006.
have not always made a positive contribution to 
the adjustment process. Asset markets have 
tended to boom as real short- and long-term 
interest rates declined, so that wealth effects 
have amplified the real interest rate channel (see 
section 2.4.) 
69. Fiscal policy has sometimes been pro-
cyclical. During upswings, budgetary authorities 
have sometimes overestimated the underlying 
strength of revenues, which have been boosted 
temporarily by a consumption-rich composition 
of GDP and, in some cases, asset market booms. 
In addition, there is a tendency to revise 
potential growth up too sharply, and to factor it 
into public sector wage agreements and 
budgetary projections. Therefore, some 
countries have failed to accelerate fiscal 
consolidation in "good times". As a corollary, 
there has been sometimes insufficient fiscal 
flexibility to support economic activity during 
the downswing. 
70. Fiscal policies and financial and labour 
market developments interact and jointly 
influence adjustment. Individual countries' 
experiences show that it is important to pay 
attention to the potential interactions between 
policies and sectors in order to smooth the 
adjustment process. Otherwise there is a risk of 
pro-cyclicality, which amplifies swings in output 
and inflation. The experiences of Spain and the 
Netherlands illustrate this risk. In Spain, a fall in 
risk premia, a relaxation of credit constraints on 
households, strong migration flows and 
demographics heavily strained the housing 
market. In the Netherlands, pro-cyclical 
developments in financial markets, wages and 
the fiscal stance proved mutually reinforcing. 
71. Finally, there can be sizeable spillover 
effects in the euro area. For instance, strong 
housing investment in large euro-area countries 
affects other Member States through demand 
effects. Inflationary pressures in one country 
could raise aggregate euro-area inflation and lead 
to a tightening of monetary conditions for the 
euro area as a whole. Hence, it is important for 
Member States to promote reforms to facilitate 
adjustment in the euro area in the context of the 
Growth and Jobs Strategy. 
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Box 3:  Country-specific experiences with adjustment in EMU 
Germany had a poor growth performance in the first years after the creation of the euro area. However, growth was 
already slow since the mid-nineties. After unification, wages increased well in excess of productivity, large 
overcapacities were created in the construction sector and public finances became unsustainable. As productivity
growth remained low, adjustment took place through wage moderation. As strong constraints were also set on public 
spending, domestic demand remained muted for a decade. Competitiveness improved markedly, through lower wage 
increases than in the rest of the euro area. Rising current account surpluses have demonstrated the renewed strength 
of the German economy, while the recent revival of construction and consumer spending points to a more balanced 
growth mix. As a result, growth in Germany is now close to the euro-area average for the first time since 1994. 
Spain has consistently recorded higher growth rates than the rest of the euro area. As a result, Spanish real GDP per 
capita rose from around 80% of the euro-area average in the mid-nineties to 90% in 2005. In the early years of 
monetary union, declining interest rates boosted investment, especially in the housing sector. This trend was fuelled 
by financial innovation and a rapid population growth. As a result, inflation increased steadily and the decline in real 
interest rates added to demand pressures. The current account deficit widened significantly to reach 6% of GDP. 
Labour market reforms, a relatively cautious budgetary policy and increased trade openness have mitigated somewhat 
inflationary pressures and positively influence the ongoing adjustment process. 
The Netherlands outpaced the euro-area average growth by 1 % point in the period 1996-2000. High growth rates 
were fed by strong consumption and investment growth, in particular in housing. The sharp increase in housing 
prices and consequent wealth effects together with expansionary fiscal policy at the end of the economic boom 
induced some overheating. The tightening labour market exerted upward pressures on wages from 2000 to 2002, 
while inflation peaked at 5.1% in 2001, the highest rate among euro-area countries at the time. The cumulative 
increase in nominal unit labour costs between 1998 and 2003 resulted in an accumulated loss in competitiveness and 
a fall in corporate investment. Significant wage restraint, together with fiscal consolidation, dampened domestic 
demand and restored competitiveness. After three years of slower growth, GDP moved back to the euro-area 
average from 2004 on. 
Portugal went through a boom in the run up to euro-area membership. Annual GDP growth exceeded 4% until 
1999, driven by strong investment as interest rates fell. Because of the rising demand pressures, wage and price 
inflation exceeded the euro-area average in the 1990s by more than 5 and 2% points respectively. Private debt rose 
gradually to high levels, representing eventually 120% of households' disposable income in 2005. Competitiveness 
was hurt, which resulted in rising current accounts deficits. Fiscal policy in the last decade was initially pro-cyclical 
and thereby reinforced domestic demand pressures, whereas the subsequent fiscal consolidation limited the country's 
capability to smoothen adjustment. Between 2000 and 2003, a sharp downward adjustment occurred as consumption 
and investment slowed down considerably. Against the background of weaker productivity and increased 
competition in export markets from emerging countries, the external sector only provided limited support. 
Adjustment challenges remain. 
2.3 RECENT IMPROVEMENTS 
IN ADJUSTMENT CAPACITY 
Progress with the Lisbon Strategy  
72. The Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs 
coordinates structural reform in the 
European Union. It aims to foster employment 
and raise potential growth in the whole 
Community through reforms in product 
markets, budgetary institutions, financial and 
labour markets.   
Moreover, as emphasised by the European 
Parliament in its resolution on the situation of 
the European economy, the Lisbon Strategy is 
also essential for "strengthening innovation, 
technological advances and human capital 
accumulation, removing remaining barriers 
hampering the operation of the Internal Market, 
and creating a more conducive environment for 
business activities".13 The fact that integrated 
reforms strengthen Members States' capacity to 
adjust to economic shocks in an economic and 
monetary union is an additional incentive to 
undertake them. 
13 European Parliament Resolution on the Situation of the 
European economy: preparatory report on the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines for 2007 (2006/2272 (INI)). 
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73. Euro-area Member States have addressed 
many reform areas that are important to 
stimulate growth and jobs. This is shown in 
the Annual Progress Report of December 2006 
in which the Commission assesses the National 
Reform Programmes and Implementation 
Reports of the Member States. Promising 
reforms have been undertaken, or have been 
planned, to increase labour participation rates, 
boost R&D and innovation, develop human 
capital and create a more attractive business 
environment, notably through policies 
improving the quality of regulation. There have 
also been important steps to reinforce fiscal 
sustainability, with governments generally setting 
out measures to improve their budgetary 
positions and tackling projected increases in 
pension and health care costs.  
Graph 2.8: Structural indicators earmarked for the 
Growth and Jobs Strategy, euro area 
(change in percentage points from 2000 to 2005) 
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
GDP per capita in PPS (*)
Productivity per person employed (*)
Employment rate - Total
Employment rate - Women
Employment rate - Men
Employment rate of older workers- Total
Empl. rate of older workers- Women
Empl. rate of older workers- Men
GDP expenditure on R&D(**)
Youth education attainment level-Total
Youth education attainment level-Women
Youth education attainment level-Men
Comparative price levels (*)
Business investment
At-risk-of poverty after soc. transferts(**)
Disp. of regional unemployment rates
Long-Term unemployment rates
Total greenhouse gas emissions(**)
Energy intensity(**)
Volume of freight transport/GDP
Note:  data and methodology could be accessed on the Eurostat 
website (http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/structuralindicators)
(*) change in relation to the EU25 average; (**) 2000-2004 change
Source: 2006 Commission assessment of National Reform 
Programmes, euro-area fiche. 
74. Structural indicators point to progress in 
several areas. In particular, the employment 
rate in the euro area rose by 2 percentage points 
between 2000 and 2005 to reach 63.5% 
(Graph 2.8). The employment of women 
contributed most to this increase and reached 
55.2%. However, this performance was skewed, 
with Spain (+7 points) and Italy (+3.9 points) 
accounting for the bulk of the improvement. In 
contrast, progress was broad-based for older 
workers, whose area-wide employment rate grew 
by 6 percentage points to reach 40.4% in 2005. 
The dispersion of regional unemployment rates 
followed the same downward trend and 
decreased from 12.9% in 2000 to 10.5% in 2005, 
mainly due to positive developments in Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Finland. 
75. Further progress is needed with the
structural reforms most relevant to increase 
the adjustment capacity of the euro area. 
Therefore, the Commission has included a fiche 
dedicated to the euro area in its Annual Progress 
Report on the state of implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy. The euro-area fiche focuses on 
reforms that are deemed especially relevant for 
the smooth functioning of EMU and, on the 
basis of a thorough dialogue with euro-area 
Member States, issues four recommendations to 
them: 
y Firstly, to make use of the favourable cyclical 
conditions to aim at or pursue ambitious 
budgetary consolidation towards their 
medium-term objectives in line with the Stability 
and Growth Pact, hence striving to achieve an 
annual structural adjustment of at least 0.5% of 
GDP as a benchmark; 
y Secondly, to improve the quality of public 
finance by reviewing public expenditures and 
taxation with a view to enhancing productivity 
and innovation, thereby contributing to 
economic growth and fiscal sustainability; 
y Thirdly, to effectively implement measures 
that improve competition, especially in services, 
and step up measures that promote the full 
integration of financial markets and competition 
in retail financial services; 
y Fourthly and finally, to improve flexibility and 
security on labour markets inter alia by better 
aligning wage and productivity developments, 
balancing employment protection and security in 
the market and enacting measures to promote 
labour mobility across borders and between 
occupations. 
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Box 4: The euro-area fiche: assessment of reforms in  euro-area Member States 
This box presents a summary of the Commission assessment on reforms undertaken by euro-area Member States. 
Macro-economic dimension: Progress has been made towards achieving sound budgetary positions. Sound public finances 
will create the necessary room to cope with fluctuations over the economic cycle and reinforce fiscal sustainability in 
perspective of ageing populations. The combined euro-area budgetary position should improve and the public deficit is 
expected to be lowered to 1.5% of GDP in 2007. The euro-area Member States with the highest budget deficits are expected to 
record relatively strong improvements in their structural balances in 2006 and/or 2007. During 2006, measures in the area of 
pension and health reform have been adopted or announced in a number of euro-area countries, including in countries 
considered to face a medium or high risk to the sustainability of their public finances. While progress has been made to reduce
deficits, some countries need to accelerate the pace of budgetary consolidation and continue reforming pension and health care 
systems.  
Microeconomic dimension: The assessment of reform efforts in the field of goods and services markets in the euro area 
shows signs of progress. While all euro-area countries took policy actions to promote better regulation, encourage R&D and 
the diffusion of innovation, the measures proposed or taken could be more ambitious in order to effectively address the 
challenge of low productivity growth in the services sector. In order to improve the functioning of the euro-area services 
markets, the adoption of the Directive on Services in 2006 represented notable progress (see below for a discussion of the 
Services Directive). In this respect, quick implementation is essential to enhance competition in sheltered services. Many 
Member States addressed competition issues in network industries (notably in the gas and electricity sector but also in 
electronic communications). Nevertheless, greater efforts are needed in many countries in respect of issues such as the 
separation of network management and supply as well as the resources and independence of the regulator. Many Member 
States are taking positive steps towards reform in the key area of professional services, whereas others yet need to undertake 
major efforts. The 2007 Internal Market Review will propose essential actions that Member States, especially euro-area 
countries, must take.  
The single currency crucially enhanced the integration of financial markets among the euro-area Member States, but more 
needs to be done to exploit untapped potential. At the EU level, some initiatives of particular importance for the euro area are
advancing, namely the Directive on payment services, the results of the Commission's inquiry into competition in financial 
services and the application of a code of conduct on clearing and settlement of securities. Some progress in the transposition of 
the Market in Financial Instruments Directive has been achieved in some euro-area Member States. 
Employment dimension: The general assessment of labour market reforms is fairly positive. A number of policies were 
initiated in order to increase labour supply and make work pay. A number of countries have adopted further measures to 
increase labour supply through interventions targeted towards particular groups (women, older workers, the young, migrants, 
and disabled people). To make work pay, a number of countries have adopted measures to reduce income taxes. These cuts 
either benefited all employees or were targeted at vulnerable groups (long-term unemployed, low-wage workers, young and 
older workers). There is still insufficient action to enhance incentives for older workers to stay longer in the labour force. 
Reforms of unemployment benefit systems to promote activation measures are also insufficient. Only limited action has been 
taken in the area of employment protection. Most Member States made progress with the implementation of programmes to 
foster human capital formation. However, they mostly focused on education for the young at the expense of training for adults 
already in the workforce. Finally, a review of the functioning of wage setting and measures to enhance labour mobility in euro-
area countries is warranted. 
Monitoring Implementation of the Lisbon Strategy - Key dates and procedures 
Autumn 
2005
Each Member State produces its National Reform Programme (NRP), which defines the main national 
challenges in view of the Lisbon objectives, as well as the policies addressing them. 
Autumn 
2006
The NRPs are followed by annual Member State Implementation Reports (IR) that show where progress is 
made in meeting Member States' own reform strategies. The Commission submits a Technical Implementation 
Report on the progress with policy measures at the Community level. 
Winter 
2005 and 
2006
The NRPs and subsequent annual IRs are then subject to a thorough assessment, first by the European 
Commission, and then by the Member States themselves. In its 2006 assessments, the Commission highlights 
what it considers to be the strengths and weaknesses of each Member State. A separate assessment is produced for 
the euro area, the so-called euro-area fiche. 
Winter 
2006
Spring
2007
The concluding section of the Commission's assessment includes specific policy recommendations covering those 
areas where weaknesses need to be urgently tackled. These were addressed to each Member State and to the 
euro area as a whole. They are discussed by the Council in view of adopting a Council Recommendation on the 
2007 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (Art. 99(2)) and on the Employment Guidelines (Art 128(4)) addressed 
at each Member State and, concerning the euro-area fiche, at the euro-area Member States. 
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Rebound in productivity growth: more 
than just cyclical?
76. Higher labour productivity growth is 
important for the euro area. For many years, 
the euro area has been lagging behind the US in 
terms of productivity growth (see Section 2.1). 
This has led to lower potential growth in the 
euro area. However, higher potential growth 
alleviates the economic consequences of ageing. 
Higher productivity and economic growth also 
facilitate the adjustment to economic shocks. In 
particular, high productivity growth could reduce 
the need for wage restraint in adjusting to a 
negative competitiveness shock.
77. Labour productivity in the euro area 
surprised on the upside in 2006. Boosted by 
the acceleration of economic activity, labour 
productivity growth in the euro area averaged 
1% last year, compared with an annual average 
rate of 0.7% during the previous decade. The 
acceleration in labour productivity in 2006 was 
broad-based. Within the private business sector, 
labour productivity growth strengthened in 
manufacturing industry, largely thanks to capital 
deepening. Labour productivity increased 
markedly in the private services sector. It grew 
by 1% in 2006 (see Graph 2.9), which 
constitutes a significant improvement from the 
previous decade (0.2%). Given the higher weight 
of services in GDP, the services sector 
contributes now as much to overall labour 
productivity growth as the industry sector. 
78. Cross-country divergence of labour 
productivity growth was marked in 2006.
Among the larger euro-area Member States, 
productivity gains in Germany have doubled 
(3.7%) in comparison with the average over the 
1995-2005 period. Labour productivity growth 
in France also accelerated to 2.5%, from 1.4% 
on average over the previous ten years. In Spain, 
productivity grew by 1.1%, compared to -0.7% 
in the earlier period. Italy presented a less 
favourable picture, with labour productivity only 
slightly accelerating from 0.3% to 0.7% in 2006. 
However the Spanish and Italian figures might 
have been subject to temporary downward 
pressures due to the effect of the regularisation 
of immigrants on employment statistics in 2006. 
79. Productivity usually picks up strongly in 
the early stages of an economic upturn and 
tends to decelerate in a downturn. This 
pro-cyclical behaviour reflects the lagged 
response of employment to output changes. But 
labour productivity growth is also subject to 
long-run dynamics typically captured by trend 
patterns. As a key determinant of long-run 
economic growth, trend productivity growth (i.e. 
productivity growth without its cyclical 
component) constitutes a core economic 
indicator. Hence, trend labour productivity is of 
significant policy relevance, as it is a key variable 
for competitiveness, potential output and 
ultimately economic welfare. 
80. A number of factors suggest that the 
productivity revival is not solely due to a 
cyclical recovery. The recent rise in 
productivity growth appears to be broad-based 
and also comprises sectors that are less sensitive 
to the business cycle such as services. Other 
supportive factors for a more than cyclical 
improvement in productivity include: the strong 
rise in the investment ratio in recent years, a 
reversal of the trend decline in total factor 
productivity growth, an increase in the share of 
productivity-enhancing ICT investment and use, 
and, last but not least, recent reforms in product 
and labour markets in the framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs (see Box 
4). Therefore, whilst a clear-cut decomposition 
of the recent acceleration in productivity growth 
into cyclical and structural components is 
difficult, the above-mentioned factors suggest 
that the recent rebound in labour productivity 
could be more than just cyclical in nature. 
Graph 2.9: Actual and trend labour productivity growth 
in the euro area  
(Private business sector, in %) 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Jan-91 Jan-93 Jan-95 Jan-97 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07
Y-
o-y
 gr
ow
th 
rat
e
Labour productivity growth (per person)
Trend productivity growth (per person)
Trend productivity growth (per hour) Forecast
Source: Commission services. 
PH_705598_CEE
Annual Report on the Euro Area    
26
2.4 COMPLETING FINANCIAL 
MARKET INTEGRATION
81. Financial integration creates an efficient 
financial system and boosts economic 
potential. The financial sector fulfils key 
functions that are necessary for an efficient 
allocation of financial resources in time and 
space and allows real sector activity to expand 
optimally. These functions include: (i ) executing 
financial transactions safely and economically 
thanks to appropriate mechanisms for trading, 
clearing and settlement; (ii ) pooling investor 
resources and subdividing investment 
opportunities, thereby overcoming mismatches 
of scale; (iii ) effectively pricing and managing 
the risks related to financial transactions through 
providing liquidity; (iv ) reflecting available 
information efficiently in prices; and (v ) 
addressing possible information asymmetries 
and conflicts of interest in the financial 
intermediation process. To the extent that the 
financial sector is constrained in the 
performance of these various functions, there is 
a consequent cost in terms of sub-optimal 
economic performance and welfare loss. 
82. Financial integration also raises a 
region's capacity to cope with economic 
shocks. With well-integrated financial markets, 
the euro area would be less vulnerable to 
external shocks, while a regional shock – 
originating within the euro area – would be 
diffused and thereby diluted more easily. 
Moreover, financial integration creates new 
opportunities for cross-border diversification of 
portfolios. Such reallocation reduces home bias, 
promotes risk-sharing and increases the overall 
capacity of the financial system to bear risks. On 
the other hand, integration increases contagion 
risk so that a local financial disturbance can 
propagate rapidly across the entire financial 
system. This could be a risk for financial stability 
if the procedures for crisis prevention, 
management and resolution remain segmented 
on a national basis, making area-wide responses 
more difficult. In this context, improved co-
operation among the relevant national 
authorities is essential to ensure that the 
financial-stability arrangements keep pace with 
financial-market innovations. Finally, empirical 
evidence for the United States reveals that 
financial markets play a non-negligible role in 
smoothing the macro-economic cycles. Better-
integrated financial markets within the euro area 
could do the same.
83. The euro has provided a major impetus 
to financial integration in the EU. The
process of EU financial integration has 
accelerated markedly since the introduction of 
the euro. The euro has created large and liquid 
financial markets in which financial 
intermediaries can reap the benefits of larger 
economies of scale and scope. Before the 
introduction of the euro, the need for market 
participants to operate in national currencies was 
a major obstacle to an integrated financial 
system. The presence of currency risk limited the 
attractiveness of cross-border financial activity, 
thereby restricting competition between the 
domestic markets of the Member States. 
However, the elimination of currency risk has 
also shifted attention to the need to remove 
remaining obstacles to financial integration, 
linked to differences in national regulation, 
supervisory practices, laws and taxation (see 
below).  
84. The global trend in financial innovation 
also helps financial integration. In particular, 
credit derivatives make it easier for financial 
institutions to rebalance their exposure to 
national or sectoral credit risk. This is done by 
issuing synthetic credit risk transfer such as 
collateralised debt obligations that are backed by 
diversified assets. This market has grown 
considerably over the last few years. Although 
precise data for the euro area are not available, 
such innovative products promote market 
completeness and have the potential to spread 
risk more evenly over the euro area. 
85. The Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) removed many remaining obstacles 
to an integrated financial market. The FSAP, 
which was launched in parallel with the 
introduction of the euro, comprises 42 legislative 
and non-legislative measures, of which 40 have 
been adopted, relating to both wholesale and 
retail financial markets. For example, the FSAP 
facilitates EU-wide capital-raising (through the 
Prospectus Directive), sets common standards 
for financial reporting (e.g. the Regulation on 
International Accounting Standards) and 
promotes investor confidence and market 
integrity (e.g. through the Market Abuse 
Directive). Recent measures include action to 
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improve the inter-operability of national clearing 
and settlement systems (through a code of 
conduct on clearing and settlement) and 
establishing common rules for securities and 
derivatives markets (through the Market in 
Financial Instruments Directive, also known as 
Mifid). The measures contained in the FSAP 
have now been largely adopted at the EU level 
and the latest legislative measures must now be 
transposed into national law. 
Graph 2.10: Cross-border holdings of debt securities 
issued by euro-area residents 
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Note: share of debt securities issued by euro-area residents and 
held by residents (excluding central banks) in other euro-area 
countries. 1997 data for short-term securities is not available. 
Source: European Central Bank. 
86. Financial integration progressed over the 
last few years. For instance, monetary financial 
institutions14 have strongly increased their cross-
border holdings of debt securities issued by 
government and corporations from other euro-
area countries (their share rose from 15% in 
1997 to 40% in 2006, see Graph 2.10.) Euro-area 
investment funds have also strongly increased 
their euro-area cross-border holdings (from 23% 
in 1999 to 47% in 2005). As regards equities, the 
ECB measured the proportion of domestic 
equity returns that can be explained by local and 
common factors15. Common factors included 
euro area-wide and US shocks. Over the past 
thirty years, national stock market returns have 
been increasingly driven by common shocks, 
with the share of the variance explained by euro-
area common shocks rising more strongly (from 
6% to 38%) than the US-related variance (from 
10% to 15%). This points to growing regional 
14 Credit institutions and money-market funds. 
15 Indicators of financial integration in the euro area – ECB 
(September 2006). 
integration, although local factors remain 
important for equities (Graph 2.11). 
Graph 2.11: Proportion of variance in local equity 
returns explained by euro area and US shocks  
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87. But financial market integration is not 
yet complete. Wholesale markets tend to be 
better integrated than retail markets, but the 
pace of integration has also varied across 
different market segments. The euro-area money 
and derivative markets are now substantially 
integrated. The market for interbank short-term 
debt and deposits is highly integrated, with 
interest rates in participating Member States 
determined by EONIA (Euro Overnight Index 
Average) and EURIBOR (Euro Inter-Bank 
Offered Rate). The euro-area derivatives market 
is making progress towards integration with a 
sharp expansion of euro interest-swap activity 
and the rise of pan-European equity based index 
trading. The euro has also led to the creation of 
a more homogenous euro-denominated government 
bond market, with largely convergent prices 
among euro-area Member States (Graph 2.12) 
and evidence of cross-border portfolio 
diversification. However, this market remains 
fragmented on the supply side, which results in 
inefficiencies restricting its full development. 
The integration of equity markets has also thus far 
been less successful. The euro has affected the 
behavior of investors, with an overall reduction 
in “home bias” and a re-orientation of asset 
managers’ investment strategies towards a 
European approach. However, there are still few 
cross-border listings. Also cross-border banking has 
increased but it remains limited, in particular for 
retail activities which remain locally oriented. 
Due to remaining barriers, mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking sector have mainly 
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occurred along national lines and national retail 
interest rates remain dispersed (for example for 
consumer credits or mortgages). Finally, 
consolidation has also taken place in market 
infrastructure. Progress has been made in the 
integration of national payment systems, such as 
through the Eurosystem's TARGET and 
consolidation in clearing and settlement systems. 
Many stock exchanges have also merged and 
further consolidation could take place.  
Graph 2.12: Standard deviation of euro-area 
government bond yield spreads 
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Source: ECB. 
88. Remaining sources of fragmentation 
create bottlenecks for the euro area. The euro 
has acted as a catalyst for financial integration, 
but more integration is needed to create an 
efficient financial system, boost economic 
growth and improve the euro area's capability to 
deal with economic shocks. As the introduction 
of the euro has removed one important obstacle 
to financial integration and increased the 
incentive to engage in cross-border financial 
transactions, the urgency of removing remaining 
obstacles has been brought to light. The specific 
importance of financial integration to the 
smooth functioning of EMU gives the euro area 
a good reason to be in the vanguard of the 
integration process and take a leading position 
vis-à-vis the reminder of the EU. For instance, a 
study on the costs and benefits of integration of 
EU mortgage markets estimated that full 
integration of mortgage markets would increase 
GDP in the euro area by 0.7% and private 
consumption by 0.5% in 2015. Gains would 
mostly derive from increases in product 
availability, which would in turn boost total 
demand for housing and domestic investment. 
The Commission White Paper on Financial 
Services Policy in 2005-2010 has set the agenda 
for EU-level financial sector reform in the 
coming years. High priority is given to timely 
and convergent implementation and rigorous 
enforcement of EU law at Member State level. 
Another priority is to ensure continuous 
consultations and impact assessments of new 
Commission proposals as well as ex-post 
evaluation of existing EU policies and rules 
implemented under the FSAP. The Single Euro 
Payments Area (SEPA) is another promising 
project to advance euro-area integration. SEPA 
will enable consumers, companies and other 
economic actors to make and receive payments 
in euro, whether across or within national 
boundaries under the same basic conditions, 
rights and obligations, regardless of their 
location.
2.5 PRODUCT MARKET REFORMS 
REMAIN NECESSARY
Competition problems and rigid prices 
remain, especially in network industries 
and services 
89. Flexible and competitive product 
markets are essential for a well-functioning 
euro area. A country with competitive markets 
and flexible prices adjusts more easily to shocks 
in competitiveness. Moreover, higher market 
flexibility facilitates the adoption of new 
technologies and enhances productivity growth. 
In order to compete successfully in the global 
marketplace, euro-area firms need to have a 
sound and competitive home base, which 
provides incentives for firms to improve 
efficiency and innovative performance. The 
internal market provides the opportunity to 
become increasingly specialised in high-value 
added production and exploit economies of scale 
in R&D, production and advertising. 
90. EMU has deepened economic 
integration between euro-area Member 
States. Better allocation of resources resulting 
from more open markets can positively affect 
productivity growth within the euro area. 
Economic integration can lead to increased 
sectoral and regional specialisation, as in an 
integrated market the emergence of front-
runners on specific location or advantages is 
expected. Research reveals that the single 
currency has increased intra euro-area trade by 
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5% to 10% and may deliver further benefits over 
a longer period of time. Furthermore, EMU has 
provided incentives for mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) within the euro area: the share of the 
euro area in the total cross-border M&A by 
euro-area firms increased from 34% in 1999 to 
42% in 2004, despite sluggish economic growth 
in the interim. Cross-border M&A are especially 
important to boost market integration in 
deregulated network industries as they give firms 
the possibility to expand beyond their traditional 
domestic markets by acquiring or merging with 
local firms. EMU has also led to substantial price 
convergence (Table 2.2): the level of price 
dispersion for traded goods in 2001 was already 
close to that of the US, while the level of price 
dispersion for non-tradeables was lower than in 
the US. 
Table 2.2: Price dispersion in the euro area
 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Services 18.3 17.6 15.4 14.2 
Durable
Goods 8.8 7.3 6.7 6.5 
Semi-
Durable
Goods 
8.8 7.6 5.7 6.0 
Non-
durable
Goods 
9.6 11.9 12.0 10.9 
Note: Price dispersion is measured through the coefficient of 
variation of prices contained in the HICP. 
Source: Commission services. 
91. Yet, there is scope for further progress 
regarding intra euro-area trade. With respect 
to the rest of the world, the trade openness of 
the euro area is similar to that of the US. The 
extra-euro area trade to GDP ratio in 
manufacturing is also similar to the figure for the 
US. However, the intra-euro area trade to GDP 
ratio in manufacturing (around 20%) was below 
that of intra-US trade in manufacturing (30%) in 
2002. Intra euro-area trade in services remains 
particularly low, representing just slightly more 
than 5% of GDP compared with over 30% of 
GDP for trade in goods.  
92. Prices remain rigid in the euro area, 
especially in services. Recent surveys on price 
setting behaviour, published in 2005, point to a 
lack of flexibility in product markets. On 
average, only 15% of consumer prices and 20% 
of producer prices change every month in the 
euro area. In the US the frequency of change in 
producer prices is similar, but consumer prices 
are considerably more flexible, with 26% of 
prices changing every month. Overall, consumer 
prices change on average every two quarters in 
the US against four to five quarters in the euro 
area. Prices of services are especially sticky. 
Downward price rigidities are strongest in 
network industries, retail trade and professional 
services, where regulation is more stringent. The 
most prominent factors preventing immediate 
price adjustments in the euro-area are implicit 
and explicit contracts with customers (that firms 
use to seek to make sales more profitable) and 
the still widespread use of "cost-based pricing" 
strategies that imply that prices are not changed 
unless costs change, and "competitors' prices" 
strategies when firms prefer not to change their 
price unless one of their competitors moves 
first.
93. The adoption of the Directive on Services 
in 2006 represents notable progress. It sets up 
a dynamic process for modernising national 
systems regulating service activities, lifting 
barriers and improving administrative co-
operation between Member States. In particular, 
the Directive introduces an ambitious 
programme of administrative simplification 
under which Member States will have to screen 
their legislation relating to services, simplify 
requirements as well as administrative 
procedures and formalities. The setting-up of 
"points of single contact" and electronic procedures 
will make it possible for service providers to 
complete all procedures and formalities relating 
to their activities through one single interlocutor 
and by electronic means. The Directive will also 
substantially facilitate the establishment of 
business (by obliging Member States to eliminate 
unjustified requirements) and the provision of 
services across borders (by limiting the grounds 
and circumstances upon which Member States 
can impose their legislation to services 
legitimately provided from other Member 
States). Moreover, an Internal Market 
Information System (IMI) will improve 
administrative co-operation between Member 
States' competent authorities by providing for a 
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tool for fast and secure information exchange 
and cooperation. Countries in the euro area 
should concentrate efforts and deploy the 
necessary resources to ensure a proper and 
consistent implementation as part of their efforts 
to enhance competition and reduce 
administrative burdens on businesses. 
94. Competition issues in network industries 
require greater effort. Many Member States are 
currently addressing competition issues in 
network industries, but a greater effort is needed 
with respect to issues such as the effective 
separation of network and generation activities 
(unbundling) as well as the budgetary resources 
and statutory independence of regulatory bodies.  
In particular, unbundling aims to increase price 
competition in the energy consumer market, to 
remove access barriers to energy networks and 
avoid distortions in network investments. Even 
when all legal barriers to trade are removed, 
market access remains hampered by insufficient 
cross-border interconnecting infrastructures. 
Competition problems persist in specific sectors. 
For example, in the electricity and gas sectors, 
incumbent firms still hold high market shares.  
95. Energy and climate policy has made its 
way to the top of EU's political agenda.
Soaring energy prices, rising concerns about 
climate change and its potentially devastating 
effects on wealth accumulation as well as 
concerns about the security of energy supply, 
have put energy and climate policy high on the 
political agenda. As a result, the EU put forward 
a series of policy initiatives in the energy field to 
address in a balanced way the three objectives of 
security of supply, competitiveness and 
environmental sustainability. Competitiveness, 
energy and environmental policies are closely 
interrelated and have a significant impact in 
particular on many basic and intermediate 
product industries. Thus, a cost-effective 
tackling now of the upcoming issues regarding 
climate change and security of supply will help 
to safeguard the competitiveness of the EU's 
economy in future (see Box 5 for an elaborated 
analysis). While this new energy policy is very 
important for all EU Member States, it also 
raises some specific issues for euro area 
members in view of its possible implications on, 
inter alia, current-account developments, price 
adjustment and adaptability of product markets.  
Entrepreneurship and innovation need 
to be fostered 
96. Business dynamism could be further 
improved. Historical data show that while 
product market regulation in the euro area 
countries declined during the 1998-2003 period, 
entry and exit rates remained substantially below 
those of the US (Table 2.3). For example, the 
average entry rate over the 1997-2003 period 
was larger in the US than in all major euro-area 
countries. The gap with respect to the US was 
even wider in terms of exit rates, reflecting the 
social stigma associated with going bankrupt as 
well as the more onerous bankruptcy legislation 
in Europe. Not only entry and exit per se but also 
the growth performance of enterprises in the 
years after entry is critical. According to an 
OECD study, US firms are smaller than euro-
area firms when they enter the market. If they 
survive, they grow much faster and reach higher 
average sizes in terms of employment.. Recent 
measures have been taken or announced to 
promote better regulation and facilitate business 
start-ups. Nevertheless, further improvements to 
the business environment (e.g. access to 
financing, restrictive employment protection 
legislation) would allow the best performing 
firms in the euro area to grow rapidly. 
Table 2.3: Entry and exit of companies in selected 
countries
Entry rate Exit rate 
Germany 4.2 3.0 
France 4.5 2.0 
Italy 3.5 3.0 
Spain 8.3 2.0 
Netherlands 6.2 1.2 
US 10.0 9.7 
Note: 1997-2003 data for EU countries, 1999-2001 for the US 
Source: Commission services. 
97. Barriers to entrepreneurship in the euro 
area decreased less. The World Bank's "ease of 
doing business" indicator shows that in 2006 it is 
still more difficult to start a new business in 
most euro-area countries than in the United 
States. This is confirmed by the OECD's 
indicator, which shows that barriers to 
entrepreneurship have declined by less over the 
1998-2003 period than barriers to trade, 
investment and state control, and that most euro 
area Member States underperformed relative to 
the US. Hence, more could be done to improve 
the regulatory environment, especially for small 
and medium enterprises. 
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Box 5: Energy policy and the euro area 
A broad policy consensus has emerged that the EU should continue on a path towards significantly reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions beyond 2012 and dramatically improving on the economy's energy efficiency. At 
the same time, the EU must diversify the energy mix much more in favour of renewable and carbon-free energies.  
To this end, the Commission adopted in January 2007 a comprehensive "Energy Policy for Europe" which intends 
to reconcile environmental aspects, security of supply and ensure the competitiveness of Europe. These objectives 
and a comprehensive Energy Action Plan with highly ambitious goals were endorsed by the European Council at its 
Spring Meeting. Main targets of the Energy Action Plan are to improve the energy efficiency by 20% in 2020 
compared to the baseline as well as to increase the share of renewable energies in overall EU energy consumption to 
20% by 2020, with a separate 10% target for biofuels. Regarding climate policy, the European Council stipulated a 
firm independent commitment for the EU to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2020 compared to 
1990. An even more ambitious 30% reduction target was announced provided that commitments to comparably 
ambitious reduction targets are made in an international agreement.  
Implementing these ambitious legislative proposals will imply a tremendous regime change as regards the European 
energy systems as well as energy production and consumption in Europe. Indeed, the twin objectives of reducing 
GHG emissions and reducing energy consumption will require a substantial cut in the use of carbon-intensive energy 
sources and an improved energy performance of goods and services marketed in the EU. Also, diversifying energy 
supplies and strengthening transmission grids to improve energy security and complete the internal market, will 
require substantial investments and improvements in energy production as well as its distribution.  
Currently the Commission works towards proposals on how to best achieve these targets and on the burden sharing 
between individual Member States. The below table shows that even between euro-area countries there exist 
substantial differences as regards key performance indicators of energy and climate policies. On the one hand, these 
differences indicate that there exists ample room for improvement without really challenging the economic status 
quo if all countries aimed at benchmarking the best performers. On the other hand, they show that there is still a 
long distance to go to achieve the overall energy and climate policy objectives.  
Table: key performance indicators of energy and climate policies.
2004 EU target EA(3) BE DE IE EL ES FR IT LU NL AT PT SI FI
Energy intensity
kgoe per € 1000 (1) -20% to 40% 185 208 159 157 240 223 185 189 194 203  146 240  329 272
GHG emission
Tons of CO2 equivalent per capita         n/a 11 14 12 16 12 10 9 10   28 13 11      8 10 15
Distance to Kyoto target
% (2008-2012) (2) 92% of 1990   n/a    -8   -4  -10  +1   -33 +1  -19  -28    -8   -29   -14   -7   -15
Renewables
Share of gross  
inland consumption (%) 
20% 6.3 2.1 4.0 2.1 5.1 6.4 6.3 6.8   1.6 2.9 20.7 14.9 11.6  23.4
Biofuels
Share of fuel consumption for 
road transport (%) 
10% 0.9  0.0  1.8  n/a  n/a 0.8 0.8 0.7   0.0   n/a 0.2   n/a   n/a 0.2
CO2 emissions of  
passenger cars 
g/km 
120 161 156 175 168 169 155 153 150 170 171 162  147  n/a 180
Interconnection capacity 
of national electricity grid 
Share of generating capacity (%) 10%   n/a 30.1 15.1 5.2 10.9   4.9 8.4 6.6   n/a 28.1 30.1 8.5   n/a 21.1
Best performance is given in bold; worst performance in italics. 
(1) At 1995 prices.   (2) Positive value means overachievement.   (3) Euro area 13.                                        
Source: Commission services. 
At first glance one would expect that energy production as well as energy-intensive goods and services will become 
significantly more expensive over the coming decade. Investments in improving energy efficiency and tightening of 
energy performance standards are likely to make these products more expensive. This might give rise to accelerating 
headline inflation. On the other hand, energy efficiency measures will result in savings on the energy bill and induce 
cost-saving technical progress. Additionally, if intended measures induce more competition in energy networks, this 
exerts downward pressure on energy prices. These factors partially compensate the afore-mentioned tendency of 
rising energy prices. Moreover, the impact of these policies on individual regions of the euro area might be rather 
different, depending on how new standards and instruments will be designed across Member States.
All this asks for a careful design of instruments to achieve the overall energy and climate objectives. Thus, special 
attention should be given to cost-effective instruments that strengthen market powers and competition and, thus, 
enable a largely inflation- and friction-free pro-active climate and energy policy.
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Graph 2.13: Euro-area Product Market Regulation 
indicators
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Source: OECD. 
98. The innovative performance of the euro 
area lags behind that of top performers. The
innovative performance of the euro area, 
measured either by Research and Development 
(R&D) spending as a percentage of GDP or by 
the summary innovation index, is lower than in 
the US and Japan (Graph 2.14). Since the launch 
of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs in 
2000, all of the euro-area Member States 
undertook significant efforts to boost R&D and 
innovation, develop human capital and ensure a 
more innovation-friendly business environment. 
Nevertheless, total R&D spending of the public 
and private sector in the euro area has been 
stagnating at around 2% of GDP, which is well 
short of the Barcelona objective of reaching 3% 
of GDP by 2010. It continues to be below the 
levels in the US (2.6%) and Japan (3.2%). 
Furthermore, business expenditure on R&D in 
the euro area, at slightly above 1.2% of GDP, is 
significantly lower than in the US (1.9%) and 
Japan (2.4%). The National Reform Programmes 
(see section 2.3) have announced promising 
reforms to encourage R&D and innovation.  
99. Improving the innovation environment 
remains an important challenge in euro-area 
Member States. Despite increased efforts to 
ensure conditions favourable to innovation, 
more ambitious action is needed. Companies in 
the euro area are not sufficiently encouraged to 
innovate: some markets, in particular in services, 
remain too fragmented; the Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) could be clearer and more efficient 
and the potential of a less constrained public 
procurement system has not been sufficiently 
exploited. Currently in the euro area only 17.5% 
of public procurement is published and thus 
open to competition. National systems of higher 
education exhibit a number of structural 
weaknesses. Moreover, the pool of researchers 
in the euro area, in particular in the business 
sector, is considerably smaller than in the US or 
in Japan.  
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Graph 2.15:  Launching of new goods and services in 
national and EU markets (*) 
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100. Euro area companies do not yet fully 
exploit the opportunities provided by the 
Internal Market. Evidence shows that over 
50% of innovative companies are launching their 
new products on national markets, while less 
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than 30% are doing the same in other Member 
States (see Graph 2.15). Other means of 
knowledge diffusion, such as patent disclosure 
and licensing, are therefore essential to stimulate 
technological progress and productivity growth. 
Intellectual property rights can play indeed an 
important role in fostering innovation but the 
design of an effective system remains a difficult 
challenge. On the one hand, granting protection 
must not stifle diffusion of innovation. On the 
other hand, SMEs, especially start-ups, have 
specific needs for patents, as their business is 
generally focused on one activity and the 
protection of a competitive advantage based on 
technology may be crucial for their survival. 
101. The forthcoming Internal Market 
Review should highlight main achievements 
and unexploited potential. Following the 
conclusions of the European Council of June 
2006, the Commission is carrying out an 
assessment of the internal market policies in 
view of the upcoming challenges in terms of 
new technologies, globalisation and EU 
enlargement. Internal market policies have to 
take into account the fact that the euro will 
progressively become the currency of a large 
majority of EU Member States. In an interim 
paper released in February, the Commission 
pointed out that policies and instruments should 
become more flexible and concentrate on 
actions they have most impact. An increased 
partnership between Commission and Member 
States would also be helpful to improve the 
governance of the Single Market. A full review 
transposing these principles into concrete 
proposals is scheduled for publication in the 
autumn of 2007. 
2.6 WAGE DEVELOPMENTS AND 
COMPETITIVENESS  
102. Wages in the euro area have continued 
to grow moderately. In spite of a sharp rise in 
oil prices, HICP inflation above 2% as well as 
strong output and employment growth in 2006, 
wage growth was contained. The compensation 
per employee increased by 1.8% (year-on-year) 
in the fourth quarter of 2006. This figure is close 
to the figures recorded since the introduction of 
the euro. There were some signs of increasing 
wage growth in the first half of 2006 
(Graph 2.16). However, in the second half of the 
year, some indicators fell to levels that prevailed 
for most of the period since 2004. Also from a 
historical perspective, the wage developments 
registered in the past few years have been both 
smoother and significantly more moderate than 
in previous cycles. This has contributed to a 
more accommodative monetary policy during 
the latest downturn. 
Graph 2.16: Wage indicators in the euro area (year-on-
year growth) 
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103. Wage behaviour in Germany has been 
crucial for the euro area. The rather muted 
wage growth in the euro area has been heavily 
influenced by low wage growth in Germany. 
Since the start of EMU, compensation per 
employee in the euro area grew by 2.5% 
annually. However, excluding Germany from the 
aggregate would yield a less-benign figure of 3% 
(Graph 2.17). 
Graph 2.17: Unit labour costs in the euro area 
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104. The different behaviour of wages 
compared to past recoveries and high oil 
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price episodes point to structural changes. In
particular, there have been significant changes in 
wage formation in the euro-area economies since 
the 1990s. Automatic wage indexation has 
become less prevalent. Labour market reforms 
that have increased flexibility have probably also 
contributed to dampen wage growth. Altogether, 
this has reduced the potential for second-round 
effects induced by the previous oil price 
increases. Global trends seem to have played a 
role. A heightened globalisation process has 
intensified the degree of competition in product 
markets and has dampened the demand for 
higher wages. The direct impact of the oil price 
increase on inflation has also been mitigated by 
the substantial reduction in the oil intensity of 
production and the strength of the euro 
exchange rate. Similarly, the share of household 
spending on fuel has also declined steadily over 
the past twenty years. This means that oil price 
increases are less likely to have an as strong 
direct impact at the production stage and on 
wage demand as they had in the 1970s or 1980s.  
Table 2.4: The elasticity of wages with respect to 
expected inflation
 Short-term Long-term 
BE 0.62 (4.22) 0.86 (3.44) 
DE 1.00 (4.76) 0.78 (1.96) 
EL 1.18 (5.3) 0.92 (1.98) 
ES 1.13 (8.36) 1.00 (5.76) 
FR 1.08 (8.75) 0.83 (2.44) 
IE 1.19 (12.8) 0.93 (4.42) 
IT 1.44 (18.7) 0.99 (3.13) 
NL 1.67 (8.52) 0.81 (2.81) 
AT 1.72 (9.26) 0.92 (1.77) 
PT 0.67 (9.33) 0.97 (7.96) 
FI 1.3 (10.1) 1.02 (4.14) 
US 0.75 (12.2) 0.83 (6.20) 
Note: Elasticities from an error correction model with 
instruments. The dependent variable was compensation per 
employee 1972-2004. Control variables were labour productivity, 
unemployment, terms-of-trade, t-values in brackets. 
Source: J. C. Duque, R. Ramos and J. Suriñach (2006): "Wages and 
productivity: the role of labour market institutions in OECD 
countries" Empirica.
105. The credibility of the ECB is another 
key reason for the moderate wage 
developments. Wage claims could be 
influenced by both past and expected inflation. 
If expected inflation increases, employees could 
demand higher wages. As can be seen in Table 
2.4, the adjustment of wages to expected 
inflation takes some time to materialise, but over 
time the response seem to be close to unity in 
most euro-area countries.16 Anchoring inflation 
expectations is thus crucial and all measures 
point that the ECB has been very successful in 
keeping them stable at a level consistent with 
price stability. Especially the longer term and the 
expectation for two years ahead have been very 
stable. The expectation for one year ahead has 
showed a slightly higher volatility and increased 
during most of 2006 but has stabilised at 2.1%, 
i.e. close to the target of the ECB. 
106. The outlook for wages is surrounded 
with uncertainty. In 2007 several wages 
agreements will be renegotiated. The brightening 
economic situation, the steady decrease in 
unemployment and the emergence of labour 
shortages in some countries could exert upward 
pressure on wage settlements. In addition, as the 
phase of wage adjustment following the German 
unification is coming to an end, higher wage 
settlements in Germany could raise wage 
demands in other euro-area countries. Finally, 
companies might feel that they can pass-through 
a wage cost increase on to consumers due to the 
stronger domestic demand. For smooth 
adjustment it is essential that the process of 
wage determination in euro-area members pays 
due regard to price stability, medium-term trends 
in productivity and differences across skills and 
local labour-market conditions 
Graph 2.18: Real effective exchange rate developments 
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107. Wage developments at the country level 
play an important role in the adjustment to 
16 From a theoretical perspective, the causal link is unclear 
between wages and prices, as the causation runs both ways 
and is blurred by a complex dynamics. 
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competitiveness shocks. A country's 
competitiveness (i.e. expressed in unit labour 
costs relative to the average of main trading 
partners) needs to adjust when its economic 
conditions move out of line with those in the 
rest of the euro area. With slow wage responses, 
there is a risk that movements in the intra euro-
area real effective exchange rates become 
persistent in the medium-term with lasting losses 
in output and employment or persistent 
overheating of the economy as a result (see 
sections 2.1 and 2.2). Cross-country differences 
in wages and productivity growth resulted in 
substantial changes in price and cost 
competitiveness in recent years (Table 2.5 and 
Graph 2.18). 
Table 2.5: Growth in real wages (RW) and labour 
productivity (LP) across cycles 
(annual change in %) 
Previous 
two
cycles 
Current
cycle Diff. 
Euro area RW 0.4 -0.4 -0.8 
 LP 1.6 1.1 -0.5 
DE RW 0.9 -1.2 -2.1 
 LP 2.1 1.8 -0.3 
FR RW 1.0 1.2 0.2 
 LP 1.3 1.2 -0.1 
IT RW -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 
 LP 1.4 0.3 -1.1 
ES RW -0.6 -0.8 -0.2 
 LP 1.6 0.1 -1.5 
NL RW 0.6 0.3 -0.3 
 LP 0.4 2.5 2.1 
Source: Commission services. 
108. Smooth adjustment requires unit labour 
costs and wages to respond to fluctuations in 
output gaps. Evidence presented in a recent 
Commission study17 suggests that the 
responsiveness of unit labour costs and wages to 
the slack in the economy varies considerably 
across countries. For example, a one percentage 
point change in the output gap of Italy and 
Austria leads to a 1.2 percentage point change in 
the growth rate of unit labour costs (ULCs). The 
response of the unit labour costs growth is 
among the lowest in Ireland (0.7%), France 
17 European Commission (2006), "Market adjustment, the 
competitive channel", Chapter 4 in "Dynamic Adjustment 
in the Euro area: Experiences and challenges", EU 
Economy Review 2006.
(0.6%) and Portugal (0.4%). However, there are 
less cross-country differences in manufacturing 
than in the rest of the economy. The elasticity of 
unit labour costs also tends to be stronger. This 
points to a quicker adjustment in industry to 
withstand area-wide and global competitive 
pressures (see Graph 2.19). 
Graph 2.19: Relative unit labour cost elasticity to 
output gap in the manufacturing sector 
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Note: BL=Belgium and Luxembourg. The graph depicts the 
elasticity of unit labour costs to the previous year's output gap over 
the period 1970-2000. Two sets of results are estimated depending 
whether the output gap is positive or negative. The graph shows 
for each country two ULC elasticities, one when the output gap is 
positive and one when it is negative. 
Source: Commission services. 
Significant cross-country differences could also 
be found in wage elasticities, with Germany 
recording a higher sensitivity to economic 
conditions than other euro-area countries. In 
addition, the response of wage costs is 
asymmetrical over the cycle: in some countries 
(see Graph 2.20), wage growth tends to pick up 
more quickly in upturns than it tends to slow in 
downturns. This is especially the case for Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium-Luxembourg 
and Greece. Downward wage and ULC rigidity 
implies that unemployment has to rise more 
strongly to trigger a change in competitiveness.  
109. Countries with downward rigidities are 
confronted with specific challenges. If there 
are downward rigidities, it is difficult for 
countries to rebalance their cost competitiveness 
by keeping unit labour costs below the euro-area 
average for some time, especially when growth is 
low. This could delay adjustment a great deal and 
lead to significant output and employment 
losses. Incidentally, countries with stronger 
rigidities tend to have witnessed higher relative 
growth of unit labour costs between 1999 and 
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2005. Finally, other hindrances could arise for 
countries with lower wage levels compared to 
the euro-area average, since there is a long-term 
tendency for nominal prices and wages to 
converge in the euro area. Such pressures arising 
from nominal convergence might make 
adjustment more difficult. 
Graph 2.20: Relative wage elasticity to output gap in 
the total economy 
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Note: BL=Belgium and Luxembourg. The graph depicts the 
elasticity of wages to the previous year's output gap over the period 
1970-2000 Two sets of results are estimated depending whether the 
output gap is positive or negative. The graph shows for each 
country two wage elasticities, one when the output gap is positive 
and one when it is negative. 
Source: Commission services. 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
110. Economic adjustment within the euro 
area remains sluggish. Growth and inflation 
differences within the euro area are not 
unusually high, but their persistence shows that 
the adjustment process in the euro area is not 
functioning smoothly. The fact that some 
current account differences in the euro area have 
become entrenched over time, also suggests that 
changes in countries' competitiveness have been 
too sluggish. Finally, adjustment in euro-area 
countries has been hampered by the relatively 
low productivity growth in the euro area. 
111. Country-specific experiences provide 
useful lessons. First, the competitiveness 
channel plays an important role but has not 
always worked well in practice due to sluggish 
wages and prices. Second, the real interest rate 
channel can complicate adjustment dynamics in 
the short and medium term as real interest rates 
tend to fall during economic booms (and rise 
during downturns.) Third, fiscal policy has been 
pro-cyclical in some countries which have failed 
to accelerate fiscal consolidation in "good times" 
and have consequently ended up with 
insufficient fiscal flexibility to support economic 
activity during the downswing. Fourth, financial 
markets have played an increasing role, though 
its effect on adjustment has not always been 
beneficial in practice due to, for instance, asset 
price volatility. Finally, it is the interaction of 
these different elements that shapes a country's 
adjustment process. It is important that policy-
makers ensure that this interaction does not lead 
to unduly large swings in output and 
employment.  
112. Euro-area Member States have striven 
to stimulate growth and employment but 
more attention is needed for policies that 
raise their adjustment capacity. The 
Commission's Annual Progress Report notes 
that Member States have undertaken positive 
steps to foster growth and employment. 
However, the euro-fiche in the Annual Progress 
Report also reported that Member States are 
doing little in the way of reforms that could raise 
the euro-area's adjustment capacity and that are 
therefore important for the smooth functioning 
of EMU.
113. Further financial market integration, 
product market reforms and sensible wage 
setting would smooth the adjustment 
process. Financial market integration is still far 
from complete, especially in certain retail 
segments. This means that the potential of 
financial markets to cushion economic shocks 
and encourage risk-sharing is not yet being 
exploited to the full. Further product market 
reforms remain necessary to raise price flexibility 
and boost productivity growth. There is 
currently still much evidence of competition 
problems and rigid prices, especially in network 
industries and services. Moreover, there are 
indications that business dynamism in the euro 
area is insufficient and that entrepreneurship and 
innovation need to be fostered. Finally, wage 
developments at the country level play an 
important role in adjustment to competitiveness 
shocks. On the whole, national wage 
developments should be consistent with overall 
price stability in the euro area and cross-country 
differences in productivity growth. Member 
States that need to regain competitiveness 
should keep their unit labour cost growth below 
the euro-area average until economic imbalances 
are corrected. 
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3. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION 
114. EMU has a global impact. EMU is often 
considered the most important event in the 
international monetary system since the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 
the early 1970s. Section 3.1 discusses recent 
exchange rate developments and developments 
in relation to global current account imbalances. 
Section 3.2 continues with a presentation of 
recent data on the euro as a global currency. A 
discussion of the rapid economic development in 
China, India and Russia and their increasing 
economic integration with the euro area follows 
in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the current 
state of play on the external representation of the 
euro area and the IMF discussion on quota and 
voice. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.1 THE EURO'S EXCHANGE RATE 
AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
115. The euro gained substantially in value 
vis-à-vis both the US dollar and the yen.
Since January 2006, the euro appreciated by 
14.6% against the US dollar in three rounds of 
appreciations in the spring and autumn of 2006 
and in the spring of 2007 (see Graph 3.1). 
Against the yen, the euro appreciated at a steady 
pace in the course of 2006. A correction in 
February 2007 was short-lived, and the yen 
quickly resumed its depreciating trend. In mid-
April 2007, it stood at 162 JPY, 15.9% higher 
than a year earlier and the lowest yen exchange 
rate since the introduction of the euro. 
116. The euro's evolution against the 
currencies of other main trading partners 
was more mixed. Since the beginning of 2006, 
the euro depreciated slightly by 1.5% to 0.68 
GBP by mid-April. The euro also depreciated by 
1.9% against the Swedish krona. While its 
appreciation against the Swiss franc was 
moderate (5.5%), the appreciation against the 
Chinese renminbi was more pronounced (9.7%).  
Graph 3.1: Changes in EUR bilateral rates 
(in % - daily data, January 2006– Mid-April 2007) 
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Source: European Central Bank. 
117. The euro's appreciation against the US 
dollar and the yen was driven by an 
improvement of euro-area economic 
fundamentals. The euro-area economy grew by 
2.7% in 2006, the highest annual growth rate 
since 2000. The US economy grew at a rate of 
3.3%, but growth decelerated in the course of 
the year as industrial production was slowing 
down. In Japan, economic growth remained 
robust, though some of the optimism of 2005 
did not materialise and it took longer than 
expected to leave deflation behind. Structural 
improvements in the euro-area economy also 
contributed to the strengthening of the euro.
The annual potential growth rate in the euro area 
has accelerated to somewhat above 2%.  
118. The euro's real effective exchange rate 
rose less than bilateral changes against the 
US dollar and yen suggest. Ultimately, what 
matters for the competitiveness of euro-area 
exports is the real effective exchange rate 
(REER). Graph 3.2 presents the REER as a 
trade-weighted average exchange rate against a 
group of 41 countries, accounting to more than 
80% of extra euro-area exports, adjusted for 
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differences in consumer price inflation (CPI). In 
2006 the euro REER appreciated 3.5% and now 
stands 3.3% above its long-term (1994-2006) 
average.  
Graph 3.2: Euro real effective exchange rate* 
(Monthly data, January 1994 – March 2007, 1999=100) 
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119. The euro's appreciation was also a sign 
of global interest rate differentials. In turn, 
interest rate differentials also reflected the 
euro-area's cyclical performance. Between
December 2005 and April 2007, as shown in 
Graph 3.3, the ECB increased its main policy 
rate in seven steps, of 25 basis points (bp) each, 
to 3.75% (see Chapter 1). The US Federal 
Reserve raised its interest rate by 4.25% in total 
until 5.25% between June 2004 and June 2006. 
As the prospect of further rate hikes in the US 
waned and expectations of rate cuts in 2007 
began to take hold, the differential in expected 
short-term interest rates diminished by some 90 
bp in the second half of 2006. The yield 
differentials of the benchmark 10-year bonds 
also decreased from a 100 bp gap last spring and 
summer to around 50 bp by April this year. The 
negative interest rate gap between Japan and the 
euro area widened, as the Bank of Japan pursued 
a cautious course. In light of continued weak 
price developments and a slow recovery in 
domestic consumption, the Bank of Japan 
increased its interest rate in July 2006 and 
February 2007 to reach 0.75%. Despite sound 
growth perspectives in Japan, expectations of a 
persisting interest gap have given rise to very 
substantial carry trades18, which weakened the 
18 Carry trades consist of borrowing in a country with low 
interest rates (e.g. Japan) in order to invest in a country with 
high interest rates (e.g. Australia or New Zealand).
yen further against the currencies of countries 
with higher interest rates.  Carry trades, which 
expose its actors to exchange-rate risk, were also 
helped by the relatively low level of volatility in 
foreign exchange markets.  
Graph 3.3: Central bank policy rates 
(Daily data, January 1999 – April 2007) 
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120. The impact of a stronger euro on 
economic growth is likely to be moderate at 
the current juncture. In the past, euro-area 
economies were able to cope with an 
appreciating currency whenever their domestic 
demand was robust, as is now the case. 
Moreover, the euro-area's export sector is 
healthy and its profit margins have increased 
substantially in the past three years. Finally, the 
negative impact of an appreciation on output 
growth via the export sector is partly 
compensated by lower import prices and higher 
real incomes.  
121. Global current account positions seem 
to have had only a minor impact on 
exchange rates. Exchange rate developments in 
2006 were only partly in line with what one 
would expect in light of the structure of global 
current account positions. While the US dollar 
depreciated substantially against the euro and the 
pound sterling, its depreciation vis-à-vis surplus 
countries was more muted. In real effective 
terms, the US dollar thus depreciated 1½ % 
since early 2006. The Chinese renminbi 
appreciated somewhat vis-à-vis the US dollar but 
remained broadly stable in real effective terms, 
even though China's trade surplus has been 
surging. Despite Japan's current account surplus, 
the yen real effective exchange rate fell by some 
8% in 2006 and continued to depreciate in early 
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2007 to levels last seen in the first half of the 
1980s.
122. The current account shows some signs 
of stabilising in the US. For the year 2006 as a 
whole, the US current account deficit widened to 
USD 857 billion, or 6.3% of GDP after 6.2% in 
2005 (see Graph 3.4). However, on the back of 
lower oil prices, dollar depreciation and the 
global rebalancing of growth, the deficit shrunk 
somewhat in the fourth quarter, to 5.8% of 
GDP.
Graph 3.4: Evolution of current account balances   
          (Billions of USD – annual data) 
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123. Imbalances also increased in the major 
surplus regions. In Japan, emerging Asia and 
oil-exporting economies in the CIS and in the 
Middle East, imbalances continued to widen. 
China's global  current account surplus increased 
sharply in 2006 – by almost 50% compared to 
the previous year – to a record USD 238.5 
billion, thereby significantly exceeding the 
previous year's record of 9.1% of GDP. Equally, 
Russia's current account surplus increased to 
USD 95.6 billion in 2006 from USD 83.3 billion 
in the previous year, which is around 9.8% of 
GDP. Oil-exporting economies in the Middle 
East received significantly higher revenue due to 
the high oil prices. Mainly owing to these 
windfall gains, oil exporters' aggregate current 
account surplus increased further in 2006 (to 
USD 422 billion) and now represents the largest 
counterpart to the US deficit. However, their 
imports have recently also increased as part of 
the additional oil revenue is being spent. This 
has helped sustain exports of the euro area, their 
closest trade partner. The yen's weakness, also 
against some regional currencies such as the 
Korean won, helped the continued growth of 
Japanese exports.19 Japan's exports to the rest of 
Asia grew at a particularly fast pace, indicating 
also the role of increased import demand in the 
region's striving emerging market economies. In 
contrast to other major global regions, the 
euro-area current account position continues to 
be close to balance. 
124. It is important that exchange rates 
reflect economic fundamentals. Excess 
volatility and disorderly movements in exchange 
rates are undesirable for economic growth. 
Therefore, exchange markets are to be 
monitored closely. In emerging economies with 
large and growing current account surpluses, 
especially China, it is desirable that their effective 
exchange rates move so that necessary 
adjustments will occur. 
125. Global imbalances continue to represent 
a risk for exchange rate developments and 
worldwide economic growth. The recent 
dollar depreciation increases the value in US 
dollar of US investment abroad while decreasing 
the value of foreigners' holding of US assets. 
Thereby, it limits the accumulation of US net 
external debt. However, in the long run, this 
mechanism cannot make the US current account 
deficit sustainable, because it would require 
foreigners to hold US assets that under-perform 
systematically compared to alternative 
investments. A failure to address global 
imbalances poses clear risks. These include a 
disorderly correction with undesirably large 
movements in exchange and interest rates, 
disruptive capital flow reversals and negative 
effects on investor confidence. Although the 
euro area's current account is close to balance, it 
would not be immune to the effects of a 
disorderly adjustment. Failure to address the 
global imbalances could also lead to rising 
protectionist pressures and prevent major 
trading partners from reaching an agreement on 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which 
has the potential to contribute to global growth, 
promote development and contribute to the 
achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals. Failure of the DDA could seriously affect 
the multilateral trading system. For these 
reasons, it is becoming more urgent to bring 
about the necessary adjustment of fundamentals 
19 Imports grew at roughly the same rate, so that the trade 
surplus was stable at just above 2% of GDP in 2006.
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that would contribute to an orderly unwinding 
of global imbalances. This should accompany 
the resumption of the Doha Development 
Agenda.
126. Between June 2006 and April 2007, the 
IMF organised a series of multilateral 
consultations on global imbalances. These
involved China, the euro area, Japan, Saudi 
Arabia and the US. The objective was to identify 
concrete policy measures aimed at implementing 
the broad consensus strategy agreed on by the 
IMFC/G7 to reduce global imbalances. At the 
spring meetings of the IMF in April 2007, the 
participants in the consultations announced a 
number of policy measures that are in each 
individual economy's interest and also desirable 
from a multilateral perspective. The 
implementation of these measures, which is to 
be monitored by the IMF, should make a 
significant contribution to the gradual resolution 
of global imbalances. 
3.2 THE EURO AS A GLOBAL 
CURRENCY 
127. In the late 1990s the advent of EMU 
triggered a debate about the potential for the 
euro to challenge the role of the US dollar as 
a global currency. Before the euro was 
launched in 1999, the United States' role in 
world production and trade, its stable economy 
and its broad and deep financial market favoured 
the US dollar as the leading international 
currency. While some argued that the dominant 
role of the US dollar would not diminish, others 
predicted that the euro would soon develop into 
an international currency whose importance and 
use would be commensurate to that of the US 
dollar. The optimistic predictions about the 
future international role of the euro were based 
on factors such as the relative size of the 
euro-area economy and its importance in global 
trade – the new single currency would represent 
the world's largest trading area – as well as a 
conviction that EMU would stimulate the 
integration and growth of euro-area financial 
markets while providing for monetary stability. 
128. Meanwhile, the euro has emerged as the 
second most important international 
currency behind the US dollar. This reflects 
inter alia the euro-area's weight in the global 
economy and its importance in world trade. The 
prominence of the euro extends to most of the 
different roles that a global currency can play in 
its international use by private sector participants 
(international borrowers, investors and traders) 
and official institutions (government authorities 
and central banks). The US dollar has preserved 
its prominent role in many areas – partly because 
of the natural advantage of incumbency – but its 
dominance has declined. As a rule, the euro is 
now the second most widely used currency 
among private sector participants in capital 
markets, foreign exchange markets and in 
international trade. 
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129. The euro accounts for a substantial and 
increasing share of the stock of international 
debt securities, which comprise instruments 
with both long-term (bonds and notes) and 
short-term maturities (money market 
instruments) (Graph 3.5). In particular, the wide 
use of the euro in international bond markets is 
a key feature of the euro's international role. 
Reflecting the opportunities created by deeper 
and more liquid capital markets in the euro area, 
the euro's share in gross issuance of short-term 
international debt securities surpassed that of the 
US dollar in 2006 (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Major currencies' shares in gross issuance of international debt securities
Average
2004Q3-
2005Q2
2005Q3 2005Q4 2006Q1 2006Q2 2006Q3 
Short-term international debt securities 
Euro 37.0 37.9 35.0 33.7 38.0 38.3 
US dollar 39.6 36.5 39.2 40.2 36.5 37.9 
Japanese yen 2.1 3.2 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Long-term international debt securities 
Euro 35.6 30.3 25.1 28.7 26.9 28.5 
US dollar 39.5 42.5 48.8 43.8 50.2 49.9 
Japanese yen 6.2 7.0 5.3 4.3 3.9 3.8 
Source: ECB based on BIS and ECB calculations. 
130. In foreign exchange markets, the euro is 
the second-most actively traded currency 
worldwide and accounts for roughly half of 
the US dollar's share (Graph 3.6). A 
consequence of the euro-area's importance in 
world trade is that the euro is used extensively to 
quote, invoice and settle international trade
transactions between the euro area and third 
countries and, in some cases, also between third 
countries. In most euro-area countries for which 
data are available, the share of euro-denominated 
exports and imports is above 50 per cent, for 
both goods and services. In international commodity 
markets, however, which are currently 
predominantly priced in US dollars, the impact 
of the euro has been limited. While oil and other 
commodity producers from time to time have 
declared their intentions to denominate their 
goods in euro, raw materials are still being 
predominantly priced in dollars. Factors such as 
inertia, tradition and the economic advantages of 
having a single currency of denomination have 
played an important role in this respect. 
131. The euro is widely used as an anchor or 
reference currency in foreign-exchange 
arrangements and as an official reserve 
currency. The euro plays an important role as 
an anchor or reference currency in the managed 
exchange rate regimes of about 50 countries. 
Many of these countries are near the euro area, 
including most non euro-area EU Member 
States, or have special institutional arrangements 
with the EU, notably candidate countries, 
potential candidate countries and the countries 
of the CFA Franc-Zone. Although the US dollar 
remains the main currency of denomination of
official foreign exchange reserves, still accounting for 
about two-thirds of global official reserves, the 
share of the euro in global official reserves has 
been increasing gradually, from around 18% in 
1999 to 25% in 2006 (Table 3.2). 
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132. The euro has the potential to further 
expand its international role. The
internationalisation of a currency is a gradual 
process, characterised by considerable inertia 
playing in favour of the incumbent currency. 
Nevertheless, the already significant and 
gradually expanding international use of the euro 
can be seen as a sign of confidence in the single 
currency and its underlying economic-policy 
framework. Therefore, the euro has the potential 
to grow further in its role as a key global 
currency.
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Table 3.2: Currency shares in foreign exchange reserves*
Dec 01 Dec 02 Dec 03 Dec 04 Dec 05 Sep 06 
Global:
USD 71.4 67.0 65.9 65.8 66.6 65.6 
EUR 19.2 23.8 25.2 24.9 24.3 25.2 
Industrialised countries:
USD 72.7 68.9 70.5 71.5 73.6 73.1 
EUR 17.9 22.3 21.9 20.8 19.0 19.6 
Developing countries:
USD 70.1 65.2 61.3 60.2 60.7 60.1 
EUR 20.6 25.4 28.5 29.0 28.7 29.4 
* disclosed currency composition at current exchange rates.
Source: ECB based on IMF and ECB calculations. 
3.3 CHINA, INDIA AND RUSSIA – 
KEY ECONOMIC POWERS  
133. China, India and Russia have become 
major economic powers. In terms of GDP 
growth since the early 1990s China and India 
rank first and second in the world while Russia 
has had high growth since 1999. Together with a 
few other rapidly growing emerging market 
economies, such as Brazil and South Africa, they 
are reshaping the world economy and have 
become key actors in the globalisation of 
production. Today, China, India and Russia are, 
in purchasing power parity terms, among the six 
largest economies in the world together with the 
EU, the US and Japan. 
Graph 3.7: GDP growth rates of China, India and 
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134. The observed acceleration of growth in 
China India and Russia is partly a response 
to the economic reform and liberalisation 
measures adopted by these countries. With 
China's reforms having begun much earlier (in 
the late 1970s) than in India and Russia (in the 
early 1990s), this helps to explain why China's 
improved growth performance significantly 
precedes that of the other two countries. China's 
per capita GDP is currently more than double 
that of India and roughly 60% of Russia's. 
Graph 3.8: Degree of openness of China, India 
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135. The increasing importance of China, 
India and Russia for the world economy 
does not only stem from the rapid rates of 
growth they have exhibited in recent years. It 
also reflects the fact that these economies are 
becoming increasingly integrated into the world 
economy, such as becoming key destinations for 
the outsourcing of productive processes by 
industrialised countries. As can be seen in 
Graph 3.8, the degree of openness of China, 
India and Russia, measured by the share of their 
exports plus imports over GDP has risen 
considerably. The increase in openness was 
particularly marked in the case of China (from 
an average of 35% in the 1990s to 63% in 2005). 
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136. China's contribution to world-wide 
growth in the more recent past has indeed 
been impressive, particularly considering the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and the 
worldwide slowdown following the bust of the 
IT-bubble in the United States in 2000. In real 
terms, GDP growth in China accelerated from 
7.8% in 1998 to reach slightly more than 10% on 
average per year over the period 2003-2006. 
China's share in global output has risen from 
1.7% in 1990 to 5% in 2005. Since 2000 the 
country has contributed about one third to 
overall worldwide GDP growth. Fixed asset 
investment, both in the industrial sector and in 
real estate, has contributed strongly to this 
impressive growth performance, as has the 
ongoing rise in exports, which are supported by 
a very competitive exchange rate. At the same 
time, the growth rate of private consumption has 
been much lower, as the lack of an adequate 
social security system keeps the savings ratio at 
high levels. As a consequence, the savings-
investment gap has increased, driving up the 
current account surplus and foreign exchange 
reserves (Graph 3.9 and 3.10). 
137. Trade and investment flows between 
China and the euro area have been rising.
The euro area is a very important export 
destination for China, accounting for 19.4% of 
its total exports in 2005, equalling 9.7% of 
overall euro area imports in that year (Table 3.3) 
Although euro-area exports to China have also 
risen considerably, to EUR 43.5 billion in 2005, 
they remain modest as a percentage of total euro 
area exports. This suggests, however, a 
significant potential for further expansion. The 
euro-area trade deficit with China has kept 
growing, reaching slightly more than EUR 74 
billion in 2005. Regarding, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), euro-area flows to China have 
been rising both in absolute value and as a 
percentage of total euro-area outward FDI 
(Table 3.4). The euro area, however, remains a 
less important direct investment partner for 
China than the United States or Japan, which 
together accounted for 18.1% of China's total 
FDI inflows in 2005.
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138. Cooperation between EU and China is 
intense and is growing. As strategic partners, 
the EU and China are already working together 
to promote world economic growth, sustainable 
development and macroeconomic stability.  To 
this end, EU-China dialogues have been set up 
on a wide range of topics, from enterprise 
regulation to social security and macroeconomic 
policies. The annual macroeconomic and 
financial services dialogue between the EU and 
China – which has been taking place since 2005 
between the Commission, the Chinese Ministry 
of Finance and the Chinese regulatory 
Commission – was complemented in 2006 by a 
dialogue with the Chinese National 
Development and Reform Commission. 
Graph 3.10: Current account balances of China, India 
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Table 3.3 : Trade relationships between the euro-area and China/India/Russia (Billions of EUR)
1990-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Euro-area exports to China 4,9 25,2 29,82 35 40,7 43,5 
% of total extra-euro-area exports 1,8 2,4 2,8 3,3 3,5 3,5 
Euro-area imports from China 24 57,1 61,8 74,5 93 117,6 
% of total extra-euro-area imports 3,7 5,6 6,3 7,5 8,6 9,7 
% of China total exports 21,5 27,0 23,8 21,3 19,7 19,4 
Euro-area exports to India 6,2 8,8 10,2 9,9 12,2 15,3 
% of total extra-euro-area exports 1,0 0,8 0,9 0,9 1,1 1,2 
Euro-area imports from India 5,8 9,5 9,7 10 11,7 13,5 
% of total extra-euro-area imports 0,9 0,9 1,0 1,0 1,1 1,1 
% of India total exports 25,8 27,6 24,7 21,9 19,5 17,7 
Euro-area exports to Russia 15 24,9 27,1 29,3 35,7 43,1 
% of total extra-euro-area exports 2,2 2,3 2,5 2,8 3,1 3,5 
Euro-area imports from Russia 21,5 42,8 42,1 47,4 56,4 73 
% of total extra-euro-area imports 3,3 4,2 4,3 4,8 5,2 6,0 
% of Russia total exports 28 46,5 37,3 41,0 42,7 38,2 
Source: Commission services. 
Table 3.4 : Foreign Direct Investments between the euro-area and China/India/Russia
1996-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Euro area FDI flows to 
China (millions of EUR) 1322 1038 1587 2724 2290 4625 
 % of total extra-euro-area FDI 
outflows 0,6 0,3 0,9 1,9 1,5 1,6 
Total FDI inflows into China 
(millions of USD) 42696 46878 52743 53505 60630 72406 
Euro area FDI flows to 
India (millions of EUR) 355 68 584 496 945 1389 
 % of total extra-euro-area FDI 
outflows 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,5 
Total FDI inflows into India 
(millions of USD) 2906 5472 5627 4585 5474 6598 
Euro area FDI flows to 
Russia (millions of EUR) 931 1475 2035 4154 2410 7595 
 % of total extra-euro-area FDI 
outflows 0,4 0,4 1,2 2,9 1,6 2,6 
Total FDI inflows into Russia 
(millions of USD) 2524 2748 3461 7958 11672 14600 
Sources: Commission services, UNCTAD. 
139. India has contributed to the reduction 
of the "Asian surplus" in the context of 
global current account imbalances. The 
current account swung from a surplus in the 
fiscal year 2003/4 to a projected deficit of 1.3% 
of GDP in the fiscal year 2005/6 (Graph 3.10). 
This was primarily on the back of strong 
domestic demand and high oil prices.  
140. India's GDP has been growing at rates 
in the vicinity of 8% over the period 2002-
2006, with growth set to exceed 9% in fiscal year 
2006/7 (April-March). Furthermore, growth is 
becoming more broad-based, as traditionally 
robust private consumption is now supported by 
buoyant investment activity (net FDI inflows 
increased by approximately 2.6 EUR billion over 
the last fiscal year to 2006/7) and a pick up in 
exports.  As a result, the economy has been able 
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to withstand adverse global macroeconomic 
developments such as the slowdown of the 
US economy and increasing oil prices.  
141. India is becoming a more important 
destination for the euro area's exports and 
FDI outflows (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). While euro-
area exports to India are significant  (more than 
EUR 15 billion in 2005, up by EUR 3 billion 
from the previous year), this only represents a 
1.2% share of total extra-euro-area exports, 
which is low given the size of India's population 
and market. The same can be said for euro-area 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
India (at around EUR 1.4 billion in 2005). 
Hence, there is clearly scope for deepening trade 
and investment ties between India and the euro 
area. 
142. Despite the economic successes to date, 
there are several risks to the sustainability of 
India's strong growth performance. These 
include large fiscal deficits (projected at 6 % of 
GDP for the fiscal year 2006/07) and high debt 
levels (projected at 80 % of GDP for fiscal year 
2006/07). The more recent acceleration of 
India's rate of growth has had a negative impact 
on inflation and the current account. This could 
be a sign that the economy may be overheating. 
In combination with structural impediments, 
such as an excessive regulatory burden and 
labour market rigidities, this could negatively 
affect the investment climate. This contrasts to 
some extent with China where - despite the fears 
expressed by some analysts - inflation and the 
current account have not shown signs of 
deterioration despite the impressive recent 
growth performance. 
143. Recent joint EU-India policy initiatives 
should contribute to further strengthening 
the bilateral relationship. The EU-India 
Summit of October 2006 agreed on the principle 
of concluding a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
between the two parties. A draft 
recommendation for a Council Decision 
authorising the Commission to negotiate a free 
trade agreement with India was adopted by the 
Commission in December of 2006. A regular 
macroeconomic dialogue between India and the 
European Union was also agreed upon at the 
EU-India Summit of October 2006 and will take 
place in July 2007 for the first time.  It is also 
complemented by a specific dialogue on 
financial services, which started in June 2006. 
144. Russia's growth has remained robust, in 
spite of the recent softening of energy prices.
Russian GDP has fully recovered from the falls 
associated with the transition from planned to 
market economy and the 1998 crisis. While the 
average growth rate for the period 1990-1998 is 
a dismal -6.3%, the average growth rate for the 
period 1999-2006 is a robust +6.7%: the CIS is 
now the world's second fastest growing region, 
after East Asia. Real growth in Russia 
accelerated to 6.7% in 2006, from 6.4% in 2005. 
A significant part of the growth recovery is 
linked to higher energy prices, but accumulated 
structural reform and macroeconomic 
stabilization have generated broad-based growth: 
less than 30% of the growth observed between 
2000 and 2006 is directory attributable to the 
energy sector. During most of this period, 
growth was increasingly driven by consumption 
and sustained by increasing export volumes. 
From 2005 onwards, with the reduction of the 
export volume growth – related to the sharp fall 
in the volume growth of oil exports – net exports 
started having a negative contribution to GDP. 
The main growth driver for 2006 became 
investment, reversing a previous relative 
underperformance of this item. Due to the oil 
price boom and the related large current account 
surplus (almost 10% of GDP on average since 
2001), Russia now has the world 3rd largest 
foreign currency reserves, just after China and 
Japan (see Graph 3.9 and 3.10). 
145. Russia is the 4th largest trading partner 
of the euro area. The euro area is the most 
important single trade partner of Russia, 
receiving 38% of its total exports in 2005. Russia 
provided 6% of the euro area total imports in 
that year (see Table 3.3), while the euro area 
supplied 43 EUR billion of exports to Russia (or 
3.5% of the euro area total exports). This trade is 
very concentrated: most of the Russian exports 
to the euro area are energy products (around 
60%). The euro-area trade deficit with Russia has 
almost doubled since the early 2000s, reaching 
around EUR 30 billion in 2005. Regarding FDI, 
the euro area is the single largest investor in 
Russia, climbing to over 61% in 2005 from 
around 47% in 2001. The 2005 value of euro 
area FDI in Russia was 64% higher than FDI 
into China. Total FDI inflows into Russia have 
risen substantially, reversing Russia’s earlier 
relative under-performance in this area: in 2006, 
the share of FDI in GDP surpassed 3%, roughly 
the same share as in China. 
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146. Also several EU-Russia dialogues have 
been set up on a wide range of topics, from 
enterprise regulation to macroeconomic 
policies. An annual dialogue on 
macroeconomic, structural and financial services 
policies between the European Commission and 
the Russian Government was initiated in 2006. 
Russia is a EU strategic partner, most notably in 
the energy field, with which the EU intends to 
deepen its relationships, in particular through an 
enhanced partnership agreement and through 
the negotiations of a “deep” FTA that goes 
beyond simple market access and includes a 
significant degree of legislative and standards 
approximation after Russia accession to the 
WTO.
3.4  PROJECTING A STRONG 
VOICE ON THE WORLD STAGE 
147. The large and global role of the euro 
area and the euro call for an effective 
external representation. Euro-area countries 
have a common interest and a common 
responsibility to monitor exchange rate 
developments and safeguard monetary and 
financial stability, both at home and on a global 
scale. This requires an enhanced representation 
for the euro area in international institutions and 
fora, in particular in the IMF and the G7. The 
objective of a consistent representation of the 
EU in the international economic and financial 
sphere has been politically backed by the 
conclusions of the 1998 Vienna European 
Council, where European leaders agreed on 
steps to ensure that the euro area speaks with 
one voice on issues of particular relevance to 
EMU.
148. Over the last few years progress has 
been made in strengthening the external 
representation of the euro area. This includes 
the creation of specialised committees in 
Brussels and Washington to coordinate Member 
State positions at the boards of the World Bank 
and the IMF, the participation of the ECB as an 
observer at the board of the IMF on euro-area 
related issues, the appointment of a two-year 
president of the Eurogroup and the full 
participation of the presidents of the Eurogroup 
and the ECB in the meetings of G-7 Finance 
Ministers.
149.  Still, the Community bodies of specific 
relevance to the euro area, i.e. the ECB, the 
Eurogroup president and the Commission, 
are represented to very different extents in 
the various international institutions and 
fora (Table 3.5). At the IMF Board, for example, 
euro area countries continue to be dispersed 
over a large number of constituencies, some of 
which include non-EU countries, which makes it 
difficult to get a common position on some key 
IMF reform issues.  All this tends to reduce the 
influence of the euro area in the IMF despite its 
significant aggregate voting power. The ECB’s 
observer status in the IMF Board is limited to 
euro-area related issues and multilateral 
surveillance sessions of relevance for the euro 
area. The Commission and the Eurogroup 
president are not represented at the IMF Board. 
Euro-area positions are presented to IMF Board 
by the Executive Director of the Member State 
holding the EU Presidency or the future holder 
of the Presidency in cases where non-euro area 
countries are in the Presidency chair. In the 
IMF's International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC), the EU Presidency 
participates but not the president of the 
Eurogroup while the Commission and the ECB 
have only been granted an observer status. In 
the G7 Finance Ministers meetings, the ECB 
and the president of the Eurogroup now attend 
all agenda items while the Commission 
continues to participate only in a relatively 
limited part of the agenda, being often excluded 
from topics where it has Community 
competence. Furthermore, the Commission is 
not fully involved in the preparatory process 
leading to the G-7 ministerial meetings. In the 
same vein, the Commission is not a fully 
recognised participant in the G20, and attends 
only as part of the EU Presidency delegation, 
although it contributes on substance to the 
process. Moreover, the Eurogroup president 
does not attend the G20 at all, while the ECB 
fully participates. In the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF), only the ECB participates while 
the Commission is the only major international 
financial regulatory body that is not involved in 
the FSF. The OECD is the only economic 
forum where all three relevant Community 
bodies are involved in discussions that are 
related to the euro area. 
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Table 3.5: External representation of the euro area: an overview
Eurogroup
Presidency
EU Presidency European Central 
Bank
European
Commission 
OECD
Participates in Economic 
and Development Review 
Committee examination of 
the euro area 
Participation in Economic 
and Development Review 
Committee, Economic 
Policy Committee, and 
Committee on Financial 
Markets
Participation in all 
committees on behalf of the 
European Community 
IMF Executive 
Board
Euro-area position 
represented by Executive 
Director holding EU/ 
euro-area Presidency 
Observer status  
International 
Monetary and 
Financial Committee 
 Full participation 
depending on the 
constituency agreement 
Observer status Observer status 
Financial Stability 
Forum
  Full participation  
G7 Finance Ministers Nearly full attendance  Nearly full attendance Partial attendance; not 
involved in preparatory 
work
G20  Full participation Full participation Attends meetings as part of 
the EU Presidency 
delegation
Source: Commission services. 
150. An issue which illustrates well the 
importance of an improved coordination 
among euro area and, more generally, EU 
countries, is the ongoing discussion on 
governance reform of the IMF. At the Annual 
IMF/World Bank Meetings in September 2006 
in Singapore, the IMFC approved a 
comprehensive program of internal IMF reforms 
to enhance the legitimacy, credibility and 
governance of the IMF. The reform started with 
a limited initial round of quota increases to 
address the legitimate claims of the four most 
underrepresented countries in the IMF, namely 
China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. Other 
elements of the reform, where further discussion 
is necessary, shall be completed within the next 
two years. They comprise: 
x a revision of the current quota formula, 
making it simpler and more transparent and 
allocating a larger weight to GDP; 
x further ad-hoc quota increases on the basis 
of the new formula, and a commitment to 
regular quota adjustments to ensure that 
quota shares evolve in line with economic 
developments;
x an increase in basic votes in the order of at 
least a doubling to enhance the 
representation of low-income countries in 
the Fund; 
x a mechanism for preventing future erosion 
of voting shares of low-income countries; 
and,
x a review of the selection procedure of the 
Managing Director. 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
151. Large global imbalances continue to 
pose serious risks for financial stability and 
the international trading system. The changes 
in key exchange rates observed in 2006 have in 
general not gone in the direction or been of the 
magnitude warranted by current account 
disequilibria. The IMF's increased surveillance 
should therefore be welcomed as a step in the 
right direction to resolving these global issues. 
Tackling global imbalances is important not only 
to prevent a disorderly correction, which could 
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be very costly in terms of world growth and 
economic stability, but also because they risk 
feeding into protectionist sentiments. The 
multilateral consultations, in which the euro area 
is an active participant, are helping to improve 
the understanding and analysis of global 
imbalances 
152. The important international role of the 
euro is a sign of confidence in the euro and 
in its underlying policy framework. While the 
dollar continues to benefit from incumbency, 
the euro is already playing a role in some areas, 
notably in bond markets and world trade, 
commensurate to that of the US dollar. And the 
international role of the euro has the potential to 
grow further. In this respect, future euro-area 
enlargements coupled with continued 
stability-oriented macroeconomic policies, 
growth-enhancing structural reforms and 
financial integration within the euro area will 
help to make the euro an even more attractive 
international currency.  
153. Trade and investment with China, 
Russia and India are important for the EU.
The EU is responding by strengthening its 
bilateral framework of cooperation with these 
countries. As large emerging economies in the 
world, China's, Russia's and India's 
responsibilities now go beyond core bilateral 
issues to also include global challenges such as 
promoting world economic growth, sustainable 
development and macroeconomic stability.  
154. In October 2006, the Ecofin Council 
endorsed short-term measures aimed at 
strengthening external representation. 
Nevertheless, the Community bodies of specific 
relevance to the euro area (i.e. the ECB, the 
Eurogroup president and the Commission) 
continue to be represented to very different 
extents in the various international institutions 
and forums. An issue which illustrates well the 
importance of better coordination among euro-
area and, more generally, EU countries, is the 
ongoing discussion on governance reform of 
Bretton Woods institutions. 
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